back the hostile attacks, and to holding the Belgian and French forces off in front of them by continually threatening to take the offensive. It was not until some long-range batteries were placed at the disposal of the division that its position improved. A couple of direct hits on the enemy's ships soon taught them that they could no longer carry on their good work undisturbed. Their activity at once noticeably decreased, and the more the German coast-guns gave tongue seawards from the dunes, the further the ships moved away from the coast and the less were they seen. General von Beseler never for a moment doubted that the decision lay with the 5th and 6th Reserve Divisions, especially as the four Corps of the Fourth Army, fighting further south, had not yet been able to reach the canal-barrier with any considerable forces. The XXII Reserve Corps, commanded by General of Cavalry von Falkenhayn, had in the meantime come into line south of General von Beseler's troops, and had already fought some successful actions. It had arrived on the 19th in the district east of BEERST and about VLADSLOO, just in time to help in driving back the Franco-Belgian attack against the southern flank of the 6th Reserve Division.[27] That same evening it was ordered to attack from north and south against the DIXMUDE bridge-head, an exceptionally difficult task. In addition to the fact that the swampy meadows of the YSER canal limited freedom of movement to an enormous extent, the HANDZAEME canal, running at right angles to it from east to west, formed a most difficult obstacle. DIXMUDE lay at the junction of these two waterways, and behind its bridge-head lines were the Belgian 'Iron' Brigade under Colonel Meiser, the French Marine Fusilier Brigade under Admiral Ronarch, and part of the 5th Belgian Division, determined to defend the place at all costs. About eighty guns of every calibre commanded with frontal and enfilade fire the ground over which Falkenhayn's Corps would have to attack. On the 20th, in spite of all these difficulties, the 44th Reserve Division, on the northern wing of the Corps, captured BEERST and reached the canal bank west of KASTEELHOEK in touch with von Beseler's Corps. The 43rd Reserve Division, advancing on the left wing, took VLADSLOO and several villages south-east of it on the northern bank of the HANDZAEME Canal. By the light of the conflagration of those villages the reach of the canal between EESSEN and ZARREN was crossed on hastily constructed footbridges, and a further advance made in a south-westerly direction. EESSEN itself was occupied, and the attack brought us to within a hundred yards of the enemy. He realised his extremely critical situation,[28] and his cyclists and all possible reserves at hand were put in to the fight. Owing to the severe hostile artillery fire the German losses were by no means slight. On one occasion when our advancing infantry units were losing touch with one another in this