At 6.30 that evening BIXSCHOOTE was ours. Unfortunately, however, owing to an order being misunderstood, it was lost again during the night: the exhausted attacking troops were to be relieved under cover of darkness, but they assembled and marched back before the relieving force had arrived. The enemy, ever watchful, immediately advanced into the evacuated village and took position among the ruins. Simultaneously a big hostile counter-attack drove the 46th Reserve Division from the high ground south of KORTEBECK, which it had captured, and pressed it back beyond the stream again. The spirit and strength of the young and inexperienced troops seemed to be broken, and only a few of the subordinate commanders had yet learnt how to deal with critical situations. Officers of the General Staff and Divisional Staffs had to help to reorganise the men; they immediately turned and followed their new leaders, and were taken forward again to the attack. Thus on the 23rd the high ground south of the KORTEBECK was won back by the 46th Reserve Division, but BIXSCHOOTE remained lost to us, and LANGEMARCK could not be captured.[32] On 22nd October, for the first time, our attack was directed from the north against YPRES. If the British and French did not intend to give up their offensive plans, and thereby their last hope of retaking Belgium and the wealthy provinces of Northern France from the hated German, they would have to maintain their positions along the YPRES bridge-head east of the canal between COMINES and the coast. For this reason the country round YPRES was the central area of the Anglo-French defence from the beginning to the end of the battle. Our opponents defended this position on a wide semicircle by successive lines of trenches and with their best troops. Every wood, every village, every farm and even every large copse has won for itself a fame of blood. The reinforcements which Field-Marshal French received in abundance he placed round YPRES, but not only for defensive purposes; they were more often used to deliver attack after attack against our young troops who had been weakened by the hard fighting; and on 23rd October they were already being employed in this manner against the 46th Reserve Division.[33] He hoped to use the opportunity of our retirement behind the KORTEBECK to break through our line and to roll up the part of the front lying to the north of it as far as the sea, and thus to regain the initiative and freedom of manoeuvre on this extreme wing.[34] However, the blow was parried by the 46th Reserve Division. In ragged, badly placed lines the German units, which had scarcely had time to reorganise, brought the hostile masses to a standstill and won back in a counter-attack the ground which they had lost during the night. On this occasion, also, the gunners shared with the infantry the honours of the day. The fire of the guns, brought up into the foremost lines,