The Commander of the Fourth Army was forced to continue ordering all his Corps to attack, in order to co-operate with the Sixth Army which was attacking and, besides this, to pin the enemy's forces opposed to him to their ground: for in the north a decision appeared to be imminent on the front of General von Beseler's III Reserve Corps: in addition to the entire infantry of the 6th Reserve Division, which had crossed the canal by the morning of 24th October, the infantry of the 5th Reserve Division and five battalions of the 44th Reserve Division succeeded in crossing the YSER during that day. The enemy was compelled to evacuate the western bank of the canal from ST. GEORGE to south-east of STUYVEKENSKERKE, in spite of the fact that there had been one French and four Belgian Divisions[40] opposing the III Reserve Corps, and that the ten howitzer batteries had proved insufficient to engage the Belgian, French and British artillery successfully. In consequence of this inferiority the old and new canal crossings lay under constant concentrated fire, and all our efforts to transport guns over the waterway failed. Many a fine piece of engineering carried out by our indefatigable sappers was destroyed by the enemy's shells. The supply of ammunition and field-dressings became a matter of the greatest difficulty, as all the roads leading to the rear across the swampy meadows were continuously shelled for a long way back. Nevertheless our front troops held on firmly to their new positions. The next operation was to break through the enemy's position here once and for all, though it was clear from the beginning that the attack would be a very severe one. Belgian and French working parties had dug a series of positions between the YSER and the NIEUPORT-BIXSCHOOTE railway, from which the ground in front could be commanded with frontal and enfilade fire from skilfully placed machine-guns and well-concealed batteries. On both wings, according to the latest information at hand, strong hostile attacks were threatening us, that is to say, near NIEUPORT as well as near and to the south of DIXMUDE. To meet these the Army Commander had replaced the 4th _Ersatz_ Division, which had been echeloned back along the coast as a precaution against hostile landings, by detachments of the Marine Division, and a few troops placed at his disposition by the Governor of Belgium, and had ordered it to march to THOUROUT. At the same time, by order of General von Beseler, long-range guns were placed to prevent the enemy from concentrating for an attack in the NIEUPORT district. However, the expected attack took place in the neighbourhood of DIXMUDE, and was directed against those battalions of the 44th Reserve Division which had crossed to the west of the YSER. The enemy realised the great danger that threatened his bridge-head from the north-west, and put all available Belgian and French reserves into the attack. Thus between five and six battalions from three Belgian