The monograph is frankly intended to present the views that the German General Staff wish should be held as regards the battles, and prevent, as their Preface says, the currency of 'the legends and rumours which take such an easy hold on the popular imagination and are so difficult, if not impossible, to correct afterwards.' One cannot naturally expect the whole truth to be revealed yet; that it is not will be seen from the notes. The elder von Moltke said, when pressed by his nephews to write a true account of 1870-1--to their future financial advantage--'It can't be done yet. Too many highly placed personages (_hohe Herrschaften_) would suffer in their reputations.' It was not until twenty-five years after the Franco-Prussian War that Fritz Hönig, Kunz and other German military historians who had been given access to the records, were allowed to draw back the veil a little. The publication of the French General Staff account began even later. What is now given to us is, however, amply sufficient to follow the main German plans and movements; but the difficulties that prevented the enemy from making successful use of the enormous number of troops at his disposal and his superior equipment in heavy artillery, machine-guns, aeroplanes, hand-grenades and other trench warfare material, are untold. Until we learn more we may fairly attribute our victory to the military qualities of the British, French and Belgian troops, and the obstinate refusal of all ranks to admit defeat. The German General Staff specially claim that the first battle of YPRES was a German victory, 'for it marked the failure of the enemy's intention to fall on the rear of our Western Armies, to free the rich districts of Northern France and the whole of Belgium,' etc. etc. Granted that we did so fail, the battle can, on that General Staff's own evidence, be regarded as a drawn one. For it is definitely stated in the monograph that the object of the operations was 'successfully closing with the enemy ... and gaining CALAIS, the aim and object of the 1914 campaign'--this the German Army notoriously did not do. The intention to break through is repeatedly stated: 'although fresh reinforcements had been sent up by the German General Staff ... a break-through had not been possible.' 'Another effort to break through should be made as soon as possible.' We are told that Fabeck's Army Group (eventually nine infantry and five cavalry divisions) was formed 'as a strong new army of attack ... for breaking through on the front WERWICQ-WARNETON.' Linsingen's Army Group (five divisions) after the failure of von Fabeck was formed 'to drive back and crush the enemy lying north of the (COMINES-YPRES) canal ... and to break through there.' Finally, however, it is admitted that 'no break-through of the enemy's lines had been accomplished.... We had not succeeded in making the decisive break-through, and the dream of ending the campaign in