The heavy artillery placed at the disposal of the Army Group consisted of 8 batteries of mortars, 20 battalions of heavy field-howitzers, each of 3 batteries, and a 30·5 cm. coast defence mortar.[52] In addition to the troops already mentioned, the 1st Cavalry Corps, the four _Jäger_ battalions of the Army Cavalry and the 11th _Landwehr_ Brigade were put under the command of General von Fabeck. On the night of the 30th October this new army of attack relieved the two northern Cavalry Corps, and took over their outpost lines. On the following morning the offensive began.[53] The XV Corps under General von Deimling attacked south of the MENIN-YPRES road, with its left wing on ZANDVOORDE, the II Bavarian Corps was on its left, with its left wing on WAMBEKE; further south again was the 26th Infantry Division with its left wing on MESSINES. In co-operation with these the 1st Cavalry Corps with the 4th and Guard Cavalry Divisions, strengthened by two battalions of the XIX Saxon Corps, which was attacking to the left of it, was ordered to advance on ST. YVES and PLOEGSTEERT Wood. The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division moved to the line MENIN-WERWICQ. The Army Cavalry which had been relieved was withdrawn to act as reserve to the Sixth Army, one Cavalry Corps being placed behind the right wing of the Army to be at hand to fill up a slight gap which existed between the Fourth Army and the Army Group Fabeck should it be necessary. The enemy had intercalated part of the XVI French Corps between the 7th Division of the IV British Corps and the British Cavalry Corps, before the advance of von Fabeck's Army; the II and IX French Corps had also recently arrived[54] on the northern side of the YPRES salient.[55] Again, therefore, the enemy had a numerical superiority[56] in what was the second and severest part of the battle on the YSER. The British in their reports have added together all the German Corps which were brought up piecemeal for the fighting on the YSER and at YPRES, both at this period and later on; and they describe the situation so as to give the impression that they had held up with inferior numbers the simultaneous attacks of all these Corps from the outset. They go further and use the figures obtained in this way to turn their defeat into a victory. They boast of having held out against great odds, gladly forgetting that their original intention both before and during the battle had been to overrun our positions and drive us back to the Rhine.