individus, sans faire plus que les nommer: par les autres, on les qualifie._ On dit d'abord ce qu'est l'individu, et ensuite quel il est." Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Logique d'Aristote, Preface, pp. lxxii.-lxxvii.] Aristotle, taking his departure from an analysis of the complete sentence or of the act of predication, appears to have regarded the Subject as having a natural priority over the Predicate. The noun-substantive (which to him represents the Subject), even when pronounced alone, carries to the hearer a more complete conception than either the adjective or the verb when pronounced alone; these make themselves felt much more as elliptical and needing complementary adjuncts. But this is only true in so far as the conception, raised by the substantive named alone ([Greek: a)/neu sumplokê=s]), includes by anticipation what would be included, if we added to it some or all of its predicates. If we could deduct from this conception the meaning of all the applicable predicates, it would seem essentially barren or incomplete, awaiting something to come; a mere point of commencement or departure,[113] known only by the various lines which may be drawn from it; a _substratum_ for various attributes to lie upon or to inhere in. That which is known only as a _substratum_, is known only relatively to a superstructure to come; the one is _Relatum_, the other _Correlatum_, and the mention of either involves an implied assumption of the other. There may be a logical priority, founded upon expository convenience, belonging to the _substratum_, because it remains numerically one and the same, while the superstructure is variable. But the priority is nothing more than logical and notional; it does not amount to an ability of prior independent existence. On the contrary, there is simultaneity _by nature_ (according to Aristotle's own definition of the phrase) between Subject, Relation, and Predicate; since they all imply each other as reciprocating correlates, while no one of them is the cause of the others.[114] [Footnote 113: Plato would not admit the point as as anything more than [Greek: a)rchê\n grammê=s] (Aristot. Metaphys. A. p. 992, a. 21).] [Footnote 114: Aristot. Categor. p. 14, b. 27: [Greek: phu/sei de\ a(/ma, o(/sa a)ntistre/phei kata\ tê\n tou= ei)=nai a)kolou/thêsin, mêdamô=s de\ ai)/tion tha/teron thate/rô| tou= ei)=nai e)stin, oi(=on e)pi\ tou= diplasi/ou kai\ tou= ê(mi/seos;] &c.]