analysed, and which together make it up as a logical sum-total. But no one of these logical constituents has an absolute or independent _locus standi_, apart from the others. Each is relative to the others; the Subject to its Predicates, not less than the Predicates to their Subject. It is a mistake to describe the Subject as having a real standing separately and alone, and the Predicates as something afterwards tacked on to it. The Subject _per se_ is nothing but a general potentiality or receptivity for Predicates to come; a relative general conception, in which the two, Predicate and Subject, are jointly implicated as _Relatum_ and _Correlatum_.[121] [Footnote 119: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1017, a. 22. [Greek: kath' au(ta\ de\ ei)=nai le/getai o(/saper sêmai/nei ta\ schê/mata tê=s katêgori/as; o)sachô=s ga\r le/getai, tosautachô=s to\ ei)=nai sêmai/nei.]] [Footnote 120: Categor. p. 3, a. 1: [Greek: ô(s de/ ge ai( prô=tai ou)si/ai pro\s ta\ a)/lla pa/nta e)/chousin, ou(/tô ta\ ei)/dê kai\ ta\ ge/nê pro\s ta\ loipa\ pa/nta e)/chei; kata\ tou/tôn ga\r pa/nta ta\ loipa\ katêgorei=tai.]] [Footnote 121: Bonitz has an instructive note upon Form and Matter, the _metaphysical_ constituents of _Prima Substantia_, _Hoc Aliquid_, Sokrates, Kallias (see Aristot. Metaphys. Z. p. 1033, b. 24), which illustrates pertinently the relation between Predicate and Subject, the _logical_ constituents of the same [Greek: su/nolon]. He observes (not. p. 327, **ad Aristot. Metaph. Z. p. 1033, b. 19). "Quoniam ex duabus substantiis, quæ quidem actu sint, nunquam una existit substantia, si et formam et materiem utrumque per se esse poneremus, nunquam ex utroque existeret res definita ac sensibilis, [Greek: to/de ti]. Ponendum potius, si recte assequor Aristotelis sententiam, utrumque (Form and Matter) ita ut alterum exspectet, materia ut formæ definitionem, forma ut materiam definiendam, exspectet, neutra vero per se et absolute sit." What Bonitz says here about Matter and Form is no less true about Subject and Predicate: each is relative to the other--neither of them is absolute or independent of the other. In fact, the explanation given by Aristotle of _Materia_ (Metaph. Z. p. 1028, b. 36) coincides very much with the _Prima Essentia_ of the Categories, if abstracted from the _Secunda Essentia_. _Materia_ is called there by Aristotle [Greek: to\ u(pokei/menon, kath' ou(= ta\ a)/lla le/getai. e)kei=no d' au)to\ mêke/ti kat' a)/llo--le/gô d' u(/lên ê(\ kath' au(tê\n mê/te ti\ mê/te poso\n mê/te a)/llo mêthe\n le/getai oi(=s ô(/ristai to\ o)/n] (p. 1029, a. 20). [Greek: e)/sti ga/r ti kath' ou(= katêgorei=tai tou/tôn e(/kaston, ô(=| _to\ ei)=nai e(/teron_ kai\ tô=n katêgoriô=n e(ka/stê|; ta\ me\n ga\r a)/lla tê=s ou)si/as katêgorei=tai, au(/tê de\ tê=s u(/lês.]