[Footnote 14: Aristot. De Interpr. p. 17, a. 37-b. 14: [Greek: e)pei\ d' e)sti\ ta\ me\n katho/lou tô=n pragma/tôn, ta\ de\ kath' e(/kaston (le/gô de\ katho/lou me\n o(\ e)pi\ pleio/nôn pe/phuke katêgorei=sthai, kath' e(/kaston de\ o(\ mê\, oi(=on a)/nthrôpos me\n tô=n katho/lou, Kalli/as de\ tô=n kath' e(/kaston);] &c. Ammonius (in Schol. p. 113, a. 38) says that what is predicated, either of many subjects or of one, must be [Greek: mi/a phu/sis]. The warning against quantifying the predicate appears in this logical treatise of Aristotle, and is repeated in the Analytica Priora, I. xxvii. p. 43, b. 17. Here we have: [Greek: ou)demi/a kata/phasis a)lêthê\s e)/stai, e)n ê(=| tou= katêgoroume/nou katho/lou to\ katho/lou katêgorei=tai, oi(=on e)/sti pa=s a)/nthrôpos pa=n zô=|on] (b. 14).] [Footnote 15: Ibid. b. 16-29.] [Footnote 16: Ibid. p. 17, b. 29-37. Mr. John Stuart Mill (System of Logic, Bk. I. ch. iv. s. 4) cites and approves Dr. Whately's observation, that the recognition of a class of Propositions called _indefinite_ "is a solecism, of the same nature as that committed by grammarians when in their list of genders they enumerate the _doubtful_ gender. The speaker _must mean_ to assert the proposition either as an universal or as a particular proposition, though he has failed to declare which." But Aristotle would not have admitted Dr. Whately's doctrine, declaring what the speaker "_must mean_." Aristotle fears that his class, _indefinite_, will appear impertinent, because many speakers are not conscious of any distinction or transition between the particular and the general. The looseness of ordinary speech and thought, which Logic is intended to bring to view and to guard against, was more present to his mind than to that of Dr. Whately: moreover, the forms of Greek speech favoured the ambiguity. Aristotle's observation illustrates the deficiencies of common speaking, as to clearness and limitation of meaning, at the time when he began to theorize on propositions. I think that Whately's assumption--"the speaker _must mean_"--is analogous to the assumption on which Sir W. Hamilton founds his proposal for explicit quantification of the predicate, viz., that the speaker _must_, implicitly or mentally, quantify the predicate; and that his speech ought to be such as to make such quantification explicit. Mr. Mill has shewn elsewhere that this assumption of Sir. W. Hamilton's is incorrect.] It thus appears that there is always one negation corresponding to one and the same affirmation; making up together the _Antiphasis_, or pair of contradictory opposites, quite distinct from contrary opposites. By _one_ affirmation we mean, that in which there is one predicate only, and one subject only, whether taken universally or not universally:-- _E.g._ Omnis homo est albus ... ... Non omnis homo est albus. Est homo albus ... ... ... Non est homo albus. Nullus homo est albus ... ... Aliquis homo est albus.