When we are reducing any reasoning to a syllogistic form, and tracing out the three terms of which it is composed, we must expose or set out these terms in the nominative case; but when we actually construct the syllogism or put the terms into propositions, we shall find that one or other of the oblique cases, genitive, dative, &c., is required.[78] Moreover, when we say, 'this belongs to that,' or 'this may be truly predicated of that,' we must recollect that there are many distinct varieties in the relation of predicate to subject. Each of the Categories has its own distinct relation to the subject; predication _secundum quid_ is distinguished from predication _simpliciter_, simple from combined or compound, &c. This applies to negatives as well as affirmatives.[79] There will be a material difference in setting out the terms of the syllogism, according as the predication is qualified (_secundum quid_) or absolute (_simpliciter_). If it be qualified, the qualification attaches to the predicate, not to the subject: when the major proposition is a qualified predication, we must consider the qualification as belonging, not to the middle term, but to the major term, and as destined to re-appear in the conclusion. If the qualification be attached to the middle term, it cannot appear in the conclusion, and any conclusion that embraces it will not be proved. Suppose the conclusion to be proved is. The wholesome is knowledge _quatenus bonum_ or _quod bonum est_; the three terms of the syllogism must stand thus:-- _Major_--_Bonum_ is knowable, _quatenus bonum_ or _quod bonum est_. _Minor_--The wholesome is _bonum_. _Ergo_--The wholesome is knowable, _quatenus bonum_, &c. For every syllogism in which the conclusion is qualified, the terms must be set out accordingly.[80] [Footnote 78: Analyt. Prior. I. xxxvi. p. 48, a. 40-p. 49, a. 5. [Greek: a(plô=s le/gomen ga\r tou=to kata\ pa/ntôn, o(/ti tou\s me\n o(/rous a)/ei thete/on kata\ ta\s klê/seis tô=n o)noma/tôn--ta\s de\ prota/seis lêpte/on kata\ ta\s e(ka/stou ptô/seis.] Several examples are given of this precept.] [Footnote 79: Ibid. I. xxxvii. p. 49, a. 6-10. Alexander remarks in the Scholia (p. 183, a. 2) that the distinction between simple and compound predication has already been adverted to by Aristotle in De Interpretatione (see p. 20, b. 35); and that it was largely treated by Theophrastus in his work, [Greek: Peri\ Katapha/seôs], not preserved.] [Footnote 80: Ibid. I. xxxviii. p. 49, a. 11-b. 2. [Greek: phanero\n ou)=n o(/ti e)n toi=s e)n me/rei sullogismoi=s ou(/tô lêpte/on tou\s o(/rous.] Alexander explains [Greek: oi( e)n me/rei sullogismoi/] (Schol. p. 183, b. 32, Br.) to be those in which the predicate has a qualifying adjunct tacked to it.]