apparent contrariety between knowledge and no knowledge is not real.[39] And in this sense the doctrine of Plato in the Menon is partially true--that learning is reminiscence. We can never know beforehand particular cases _per se_; but in proportion as we extend our induction to each case **successively, we, as it were, recognize that, which we knew beforehand as a general truth, to be realized in each. Thus when we ascertain the given figure before us to be a triangle, we know immediately that its three angles are equal to two right angles.[40] [Footnote 36: Analyt. Prior. II. xxi. p. 66, b. 18: [Greek: sumbai/nei d' e)ni/ote, katha/per e)n tê=| the/sei tô=n o(/rôn a)patô/metha, kai\ kata\ tê\n u(po/lêpsin gi/nesthai tê\n a)pa/tên.] The vague and general way in which Aristotle uses the term [Greek: u(po/lêpsis], seems to be best rendered by our word _belief_. See Trendelenburg ad Aristot. De Animâ, p. 469; Biese, Philos. des Aristot. i. p. 211.] [Footnote 37: Ibid. II. xxi. p. 66, b. 33: [Greek: ô(/ste o(/ pôs e)pi/statai, tou=to o(/lôs a)xioi= mê\ u(polamba/nein; o(/per a)du/naton.]] [Footnote 38: Ibid. II. xxi. p. 67, a. 5-8.] [Footnote 39: Analyt. Prior. II. xxi. p. 67, a. 19: [Greek: ou(/tô me\n ou)=n ô(s tê=| katho/lou ou)=de to G o(/ti du/o o)rthai/, ô(s de\ tê=| kath' e(/kaston ou)k oi)=den, ô(/st' ou)ch e(/xei ta\s e)nanti/as] (sc. [Greek: e)pistê/mos]).] [Footnote 40: Ibid. a. 22: [Greek: ou)damou= ga\r sumbai/nei proepi/stasthai to\ kath' e(/kaston, a)ll' a(/ma tê=| e)pagôgê=| lamba/nein tê\n tô=n kata\ me/ros e)pistê/mên _ô(/sper a)nagnôri/zontas_], &c. Cf. Anal. Post. I. ii. p. 71, b. 9, seq.; Plato, Menon, pp. 81-82.]