[Footnote 67: Ibid. b. 25-37. [Greek: a)ei\ to\ me/son puknou=tai, e(/ôs a)diai/reta ge/nêtai kai\ e(/n. e)/sti d' e(/n, o(/tan a)/meson ge/nêtai kai\ mi/a pro/tasis a(plô=s ê( a)/mesos.]] [Footnote 68: Analyt. Post. I. xxiii. p. 84, b. 37: [Greek: kai\ ô(/sper e)n toi=s a)/llois ê( a)rchê\ a(plou=n, tou=to d' ou) tau)to\ pantachou=, a)ll' e)n barei= me\n mna=, e)n de\ me/lei di/esis, a)/llo d' e)n a)/llô|, ou(/tôs e)n sullogismô=| to\ e(\n pro/tasis a)/mesos, e)n d' a)podei/xei kai\ e)pistê/mê| o( nou=s.]] [Footnote 69: Ibid. b. 35-p. 85, a. 1.] Having thus, in the long preceding reasoning, sought to prove that all demonstration must take its departure from primary undemonstrable _principia_--from some premisses, affirmative and negative, which are directly true in themselves, and not demonstrable through any middle term or intervening propositions, Aristotle now passes to a different enquiry. We have some demonstrations in which the conclusion is Particular, others in which it is Universal: again, some Affirmative, some Negative, Which of the two, in each of these alternatives, is the best? We have also demonstrations Direct or Ostensive, and demonstrations Indirect or by way of _Reductio ad Absurdum_. Which of these two is the best? Both questions appear to have been subjected to debate by contemporary philosophers.[70] [Footnote 70: Ibid. xxiv. p. 85, a. 13-18. [Greek: a)mphisbêtei=tai pote/ra belti/ôn; ô(s d' au(/tôs kai\ peri\ tê=s a)podeiknu/nai legome/nês kai\ tê=s ei)s to\ a)du/naton a)gou/sês a)podei/xeôs.]] Aristotle discusses these points dialectically (as indeed he points out in the Topica that the comparison of two things generally, as to better and worse, falls under the varieties of **dialectical enquiry[71]), first stating and next refuting the arguments on the weaker side. Some persons may think (he says) that demonstration of the Particular is better than demonstration of the Universal: first, because it conducts to fuller cognition of that which the thing is in itself, and not merely that which it is _quatenus_ member of a class; secondly, because demonstrations of the Universal are apt to generate an illusory belief, that the Universal is a distinct reality apart from and independent of all its particulars (_i.e._, that figure in general has a real existence apart from all particular figures, and number in general apart from all particular numbers, &c.), while demonstrations of the Particular do not lead to any such illusion.[72] [Footnote 71: Aristot. Topic. III. i. p. 116, a. 1, seq.] [Footnote 72: Analyt. Post. I. xxiv. p. 85, a. 20-b. 3. Themistius, pp. 58-59, Spengel: [Greek: ou) ga\r o(mô/numon to\ katho/lou e)sti/n, ou)de\ phônê\ mo/non, a)ll' u(po/stasis, ou) chôristê\ me\n ô(/sper ou)de\ ta\ sumbebêko/ta, e)nargô=s d' ou)=n emphainome/nê toi=s pra/gmasin.] The Scholastic doctrine of _Universalia in re_ is here expressed very clearly by Themistius.]