fortune? If an identity can be found, this will be the essence or definition of magnanimity; to which will belong equanimity as one variety, and intolerance of insult as another. If, on the contrary, no identity can be found, you will then have two distinct mental dispositions, without any common definition.[48] [Footnote 46: Analyt. Post. II. xiii. p. 97, b. 7-15. [Greek: pa/lin skopei=n ei) tau)to\n e(/ôs a)\n ei)s e(/na e)/lthê| lo/gon; ou(=tos ga\r e)/stai tou= pra/gmatos o(rismo/s. e)a\n de\ mê\ badi/zê| ei)s e(/na a)ll' ei)s du/o ê)\ plei/ô, dê=lon o(/ti ou)k a)\n ei)/ê e(/n ti ei)=nai to\ zêtou/menon, a)lla\ plei/ô.]] [Footnote 47: Ibid. b. 16: [Greek: skepte/on e)pi/ tinôn megalopsu/chôn, ou(\s i)/smen, ti/ e)/chousin e(\n pa/ntes ê(=| _toiou=toi_.]] [Footnote 48: Ibid. b. 17-25. [Greek: tau=ta du/o labô\n skopô= ti/ to\ au)to\ e)/chousin ê(/ te a)pa/theia ê( peri\ ta\s tu/chas kai\ ê( mê\ u(pomonê\ a)timazome/nôn. ei) de\ mêde/n, du/o ei)/dê a)\n ei)/ê tê=s megalopsuchi/as.] Æquam memento rebus in arduis Servare mentem: non secus in bonis Ab insolenti temperatam Lætitiâ.--Horace. _Ode_, ii. 3. Aristotle says that there will be two species of magnanimity. But surely if the two so-called species connote nothing in common they are not rightly called species, nor is magnanimity rightly called a genus. Equanimity would be distinct from magnanimity; Sokrates and Lysander would not properly be magnanimous but equanimous.] Every definition must be an universal proposition, applicable, not exclusively to one particular object, but to a class of greater or less extent. The lowest species is easier to define than the higher genus; this is one reason why we must begin with particulars, and ascend to universals. It is in the higher genera that equivocal terms most frequently escape detection.[49] When you are demonstrating, what you have first to attend to is, the completeness of the form of syllogizing: when you are defining, the main requisite is to be perspicuous and intelligible; _i.e._ to avoid equivocal or metaphorical terms.[50] You will best succeed in avoiding them, if you begin with the individuals, or with examples of the lowest species, and then proceed to consider not their resemblances generally, but their resemblances in certain definite ways, as in colour or figure. These more definite resemblances you will note first; upon each you will found a formula of separate definition; after which you will ascend to the more general formula of less definite resemblance common to both. Thus, in regard to the acute or sharp, you will consider the acute in sound, and in other matters (tastes, pains, weapons, angles, &c.), and you will investigate what is the common point of identity characterizing all. Perhaps there may be no such identity; the transfer of the term from one to the other may be only a metaphor: you will thus learn that no common definition is attainable. This is an important lesson; for as we are forbidden