We will now show of what numbers and of what sort of people a government
ought to consist, that the state may be happy and well administered.
As there are two particulars on which the excellence and perfection of
everything depend, one of these is, that the object and end proposed
should be proper; the other, that the means to accomplish it should be
adapted to that purpose; for it may happen that these may either agree
or disagree with each other; for the end we propose may be good, but in
taking the means to obtain it we may err; at other times we may have
the right and proper means in our power, but the end may be bad,
and sometimes we may mistake in both; as in the art of medicine the
physician does not sometimes know in what situation the body ought to
be, to be healthy; nor what to do to procure the end he aims at. In
every art and science, therefore, we should be master of this knowledge,
namely, the proper end, and the means to obtain it. Now it is evident
that all persons are desirous to live well and be happy; but that some
have the means thereof in their own power, others not; and this either
through nature [1332a] or fortune; for many ingredients are necessary to
a happy life; but fewer to those who are of a good than to those who are
of a bad disposition. There are others who continually have the means
of happiness in their own power, but do not rightly apply them. Since
we propose to inquire what government is best, namely, that by which
a state may be best administered, and that state is best administered
where the people are the happiest, it is evident that happiness is a
thing we should not be unacquainted with. Now, I have already said in
my treatise on Morals (if I may here make any use of what I have there
shown), that happiness consists in the energy and perfect practice of
virtue; and this not relatively, but simply; I mean by relatively, what
is necessary in some certain circumstances; by simply, what is good and
fair in itself: of the first sort are just punishments, and restraints
in a just cause; for they arise from virtue and are necessary, and on
that account are virtuous; though it is more desirable that neither any
state nor any individual should stand in need of them; but those actions
which are intended either to procure honour or wealth are simply good;
the others eligible only to remove an evil; these, on the contrary, are
the foundation and means of relative good. A worthy man indeed will bear
poverty, disease, and other unfortunate accidents with a noble mind;
but happiness consists in the contrary to these (now we have already
determined in our treatise on Morals, that he is a man of worth who
considers what is good because it is virtuous as what is simply good; it
is evident, therefore, that all the actions of such a one must be worthy
and simply good): this has led some persons to conclude, that the cause
of happiness was external goods; which would be as if any one should