The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle — Aristotle — John Shaqi
The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
Aristotle · en
And to be unable to live with reference to any other but a friend;
because doing so is servile, as may be seen in that all flatterers are
low and men in low estate are flatterers. Neither is his admiration
easily excited, because nothing is great in his eyes; nor does he bear
malice, since remembering anything, and specially wrongs, is no part of
Great-mindedness, but rather overlooking them; nor does he talk of
other men; in fact, he will not speak either of himself or of any
other; he neither cares to be praised himself nor to have others
blamed; nor again does he praise freely, and for this reason he is not
apt to speak ill even of his enemies except to show contempt and
insolence.
And he is by no means apt to make laments about things which cannot be
helped, or requests about those which are trivial; because to be thus
disposed with respect to these things is consequent only upon real
anxiety about them. Again, he is the kind of man to acquire what is
beautiful and unproductive rather than what is productive and
profitable: this being rather the part of an independent man.
Also slow motion, deep-toned voice, and deliberate style of speech, are
thought to be characteristic of the Great-minded man: for he who is
earnest about few things is not likely to be in a hurry, nor he who
esteems nothing great to be very intent: and sharp tones and quickness
are the result of these.
Chapter V.
This then is my idea of the Great-minded man; and he who is in the
defect is a Small-minded man, he who is in the excess a Vain man.
However, as we observed in respect of the last character we discussed,
these extremes are not thought to be vicious exactly, but only
mistaken, for they do no harm.
The Small-minded man, for instance, being really worthy of good
deprives himself of his deserts, and seems to have somewhat faulty from
not having a sufficiently high estimate of his own desert, in fact from
self-ignorance: because, but for this, he would have grasped after what
he really is entitled to, and that is good. Still such characters are
not thought to be foolish, but rather laggards. But the having such an
opinion of themselves seems to have a deteriorating effect on the
character: because in all cases men’s aims are regulated by their
supposed desert, and thus these men, under a notion of their own want
of desert, stand aloof from honourable actions and courses, and
similarly from external goods.
But the Vain are foolish and self-ignorant, and that palpably: because
they attempt honourable things, as though they were worthy, and then
they are detected. They also set themselves off, by dress, and
carriage, and such-like things, and desire that their good
circumstances may be seen, and they talk of them under the notion of
receiving honour thereby. Small-mindedness rather than Vanity is
opposed to Great-mindedness, because it is more commonly met with and
is worse.
Chapter VI.