But the judgment of God is a hidden one, when man cannot arrive at the knowledge of it either by the law of nature or by the written law, but only occasionally by a special grace. This grace comes in several ways: sometimes by simple revelation, sometimes by revelation assisted by a certain kind of trial or debate. Simple revelation, too, is of two kinds: either God gives it of his own accord, or it is gained by prayer. God gives it of his own accord in two ways, either plainly, or by a sign. His judgment against Saul was revealed to Samuel plainly; but it was by a sign that it was revealed to Pharaoh what God had judged touching the setting free of the children of Israel. The judgment of God is also given in answer to prayer, as he knew who spoke in the second book of Chronicles:[250] "When we know not what we ought to do, this only have we left, to direct our eyes to Thee." [Footnote 250: 2 Chron. xx. 12 (Vulg.).] Revelation by means of trial is also of two kinds. It is given either by casting lots, or by combat; for "to strive" (_certare_), is derived from a phrase which means "to make certain" (_certum facere_). It is clear that the judgment of God is sometimes revealed to men by casting lots, as in the substitution of Matthias in the Acts of the Apostles. Again the judgment of God is revealed to men by combat in two ways: either it is by a trial of strength, as in the duels of champions who are called "_duelliones_," or it is by the contention of many men, each striving to reach a certain mark first, as happens in the contests of athletes who run for a prize. The first of these methods was prefigured among the Gentiles by the contests between Hercules and Antæus, which Lucan mentions in the fourth book of his _Pharsalia_, and Ovid in the ninth book of his _Metamorphoses_. The second is prefigured by the contest between Atalanta and Hippomenes, described in the tenth book of Ovid's _Metamorphoses_.[251] [Footnote 251: _Phars._ iv. 593; _Metam._ ix. 183, x. 569.--(W.).] Moreover, it ought not to pass unnoticed concerning these two kinds of strife, that while in the first each champion may fairly hinder his antagonist, in the second this is not so; for athletes must not hinder one another in their strife, though our poet seems to have thought differently in the fifth _Æneid_ where Euryalus so receives the prize.[252] But Cicero has done better in forbidding this practice in the third book of the _De Officiis_, following the opinion of Chrysippus.[253] He there says: "Chrysippus is right here, as he often is, for he says that he who runs in a race should strive with all his might to win, but in no way should he try to trip up his competitor." [Footnote 252: V. 335--(W.)] [Footnote 253: III. 10.--(W.)]