Dante. An essay. To which is added a translation of De Monarchia.
Dante Alighieri · en
Secondly, seeing that these two kinds of rule are to guide men to
certain ends, as we shall see, it follows that if man had remained in
the state of innocence in which God created him, he would not have
needed such means of guidance. These kinds of rule, then, are remedies
against the weakness of sin. Since, then, man was not a sinner on the
fourth day, for he did not then even exist, it would have been idle to
make remedies for his sin, and this would be contrary to the goodness
of God. For he would be a sorry physician who would make a plaster
for an abscess which was to be, before the man was born. It cannot,
therefore, be said that God made these two kinds of rule on the fourth
day, and therefore the meaning of Moses cannot have been what these
men pretend.
We may also be more tolerant, and overthrow this falsehood by drawing
a distinction. This way of distinction is a gentler way of treating an
adversary, for so his arguments are not made to appear consciously
false, as is the case when we utterly overthrow him. I say then that,
although the moon has not light of its own abundantly, unless it
receives it from the sun, yet it does not therefore follow that the
moon is from the sun. Therefore be it known that the being, and the
power, and the working of the moon are all different things. For its
being, the moon in no way depends on the sun, nor for its power, nor
for its working, considered in itself. Its motion comes from its
proper mover, its influence is from its own rays. For it has a certain
light of its own, which is manifest at the time of an eclipse; though
for its better and more powerful working it receives from the sun an
abundant light, which enables it to work more powerfully.
Therefore I say that the temporal power does not receive its being
from the spiritual power, nor its power which is its authority, nor
its working considered in itself. Yet it is good that the temporal
power should receive from the spiritual the means of working more
effectively by the light of the grace which the benediction of the
Supreme Pontiff bestows on it both in heaven and on earth. Therefore
we may see that the argument of these men erred in its form, because
the predicate of the conclusion is not the predicate of the major
premiss. The argument runs thus: The moon receives her light from the
sun, which is the spiritual power. The temporal power is the moon.
Therefore the temporal power receives authority from the spiritual
power. "Light" is the predicate of the major premiss, "authority" the
predicate of the conclusion; which two things we have seen to be very
different in their subject and in their idea.