The Two First Centuries of Florentine History: The Republic and Parties at the Time of Dante. Fourth Impression. — Dante Alighieri — John Shaqi
The Two First Centuries of Florentine History: The Republic and Parties at the Time of Dante. Fourth Impression.
Dante Alighieri · en
In Verona,[391] women might, under a will, share equally with their
brothers; but _ab intestato_, they had only their dower. In Pisa,
testate succession was regulated in accordance with the Roman law:
_de ultimis voluntatibus pen legem romanum iudicetur_. The lawful
share, however, was fixed on almost the same scale as by Longobard
law; and, as provided by that law, one child might be favoured more
than the rest. As regards intestate succession, male heirs had, as
always, marked preference. Failing descendants in the male line,
females inherited, but even in the succession to maternal estate, male
descendants had priority when there were no surviving daughters.[392]
This rule prevails in all statute books, not excluding the
"Consuetudini" of Naples, of Amalfi, and of Sorrento, although in these
cities the influence of the Longobard law was much less felt.[393]
The real object of these regulations is clearly expressed in the
statutes themselves. In the statutes of Mantua it is thus set forth:
"Ut familiarum dignitas, nomen et ordo serventur, et bona morientium
in eorum agnatos et posteros transmittantur, per quos nomina generis
conservantur, statuimus et ordinamus,"[394] &c.
It would seem that in Ravenna the prolonged continuance of the
Byzantine rule had the effect of suppressing this preference of
the agnates, and that there the Novel of Justinian was in force.
The same was the case at Osimo. Adoption was of rare occurrence;
legitimated children were postponed to legitimate; natural children
who, under the influence of the Longobard law, had been favoured in
earlier statutes, were afterwards neglected, in consequence of the
growing ascendancy of Canon and Roman law. The whole statutory law of
succession is so dominated by the political conception which, so far
from losing, is constantly gaining ground, that the disposing power of
the testator--always extremely restricted--can only arrive at a result
slightly more equitable and natural, but never attains to absolute
freedom of decision in the Roman sense of the word. In this, as in
every branch of civil law, the Florentine Statute Book, like all the
others, does not present us with a complete treatise, but only with
fragments, the statutes making constant reference to the Roman law.