Three Philosophical Poets: Lucretius, Dante, and Goethe — Dante Alighieri — John Shaqi
Three Philosophical Poets: Lucretius, Dante, and Goethe
Dante Alighieri · en
Some of these illusions are already abandoned; all are undermined.
Sometimes, in moments when we are unnerved and uninspired, we may
regret the ease with which Dante could reconcile himself to a world, so
imagined as to suit human fancy, and flatter human will. We may envy
Dante his ignorance of nature, which enabled him to suppose that he
dominated it, as an infinite and exuberant nature cannot be dominated
by any of its parts. In the end, however, knowledge is good for the
imagination. Dante himself thought so; and his work proved that he was
right, by infinitely excelling that of all ignorant contemporary poets.
The illusion of knowledge is better than ignorance for a poet; but the
reality of knowledge would be better than the illusion; it would
stretch the mind over a vaster and more stimulating scene; it would
concentrate the will upon a more attainable, distinct, and congenial
happiness. The growth of what is known increases the scope of what may
be imagined and hoped for. Throw open to the young poet the infinity of
nature; let him feel the precariousness of life, the variety of
purposes, civilizations, and religions even upon this little planet;
let him trace the triumphs and follies of art and philosophy, and their
perpetual resurrections--like that of the downcast Faust. If, under the
stimulus of such a scene, he does not some day compose a natural comedy
as much surpassing Dante’s divine comedy in sublimity and richness as
it will surpass it in truth, the fault will not lie with the subject,
which is inviting and magnificent, but with the halting genius that
cannot render that subject worthily.
Undoubtedly, the universe so displayed would not be without its dark
shadows and its perpetual tragedies. That is in the nature of things.
Dante’s cosmos, for all its mythical idealism, was not so false as not
to have a hell in it. Those rolling spheres, with all their lights and
music, circled for ever about hell. Perhaps in the real life of nature
evil may not prove to be so central as that. It would seem to be rather
a sort of inevitable but incidental friction, capable of being
diminished indefinitely, as the world is better known and the will is
better educated. In Dante’s spheres there could be no discord whatever;
but at the core of them was eternal woe. In the star-dust of our physics
discords are everywhere, and harmony is only tentative and approximate,
as it is in the best earthly life; but at the core there is nothing
sinister, only freedom, innocence, inexhaustible possibilities of all
sorts of happiness. These possibilities may tempt future poets to
describe them; but meantime, if we wish to have a vision of nature not
fundamentally false, we must revert from Dante to Lucretius.