A Discourse of a Method for the Well Guiding of Reason: and the Discovery of Truth in the Sciences — Descartes — John Shaqi
A Discourse of a Method for the Well Guiding of Reason: and the Discovery of Truth in the Sciences
Descartes · en
And I thought it easie for me to choose some matters, which being not
subject to many Controversies, nor obliging me to declare any more of my
Principles then I would willingly, would neverthelesse expresse clearly
enough, what my abilities or defects are in the Sciences. Wherein I
cannot say whether I have succeeded or no; neither will I prevent the
judgment of any man by speaking of my own Writings: but I should be
glad they might be examin'd; and to that end I beseech all those who
have any objections to make, to take the pains to send them to my
Stationer, that I being advertised by him, may endeavour at the same
time to adjoyn my Answer thereunto: and by that means, the Reader seeing
both the one and the other, may the more easily judge of the Truth. For
I promise, that I will never make any long Answers, but only very freely
confesse my own faults, if I find them; or if I cannot discover them,
plainly say what I shal think requisite in defence of what I have writ,
without adding the explanation of any new matter, that I may not
endlesly engage my self out of one into another.
Now if there be any whereof I have spoken in the beginning, of the
Opticks and of the Meteors, which at first jarr, by reason that I call
them Suppositions, and that I seem not willing to prove them; let a man
have but the patience to read the whole attentively, and I hope he will
rest satisfied: For (me thinks) the reasons follow each other so
closely, that as the later are demonstrated by the former, which are
their Causes; the former are reciprocally proved by the later, which are
their Effects. And no man can imagine that I herein commit the fault
which the Logicians call a _Circle_; for experience rendring the
greatest part of these effects most certain, the causes whence I deduce
them serve not so much to prove, as to explain them; but on the
contrary, they are those which are proved by them. Neither named I them
Suppositions, that it might be known that I conceive my self able to
deduce them from those first Truths which I have before discovered: But
that I would not expresly do it to crosse certain spirits, who imagine
that they know in a day al what another may have thought in twenty
yeers, as soon as he hath told them but two or three words; and who are
so much the more subject to erre, and less capable of the Truth, (as
they are more quick and penetrating) from taking occasion of erecting
some extravagant Philosophy on what they may beleeve to be my
Principles, and lest the fault should be attributed to me. For as for
those opinions which are wholly mine, I excuse them not as being new,
because that if the reasons of them be seriously considered, I assure my
self, they will be found so plain, and so agreeable to common sense,
that they will seem less extraordinary and strange then any other which
may be held on the same Subjects. Neither do I boast that I am the first
Inventor of any of them; but of this indeed, that I never admitted any