Meditations on First Philosophy — Descartes — John Shaqi
Meditations on First Philosophy
Descartes · Latin
where the purpose sought to be realized is indifferent: but because I
did not find anything on earth which was wholly superior to change, and
because, for myself in particular, I hoped gradually to perfect my
judgments, and not to suffer them to deteriorate, I would have deemed
it a grave sin against good sense, if, for the reason that I approved
of something at a particular time, I therefore bound myself to hold it
for good at a subsequent time, when perhaps it had ceased to be so, or
I had ceased to esteem it such.
My _second_ maxim was to be as firm and resolute in my actions as I was
able, and not to adhere less steadfastly to the most doubtful opinions,
when once adopted, than if they had been highly certain; imitating in
this the example of travelers who, when they have lost their way in a
forest, ought not to wander from side to side, far less remain in one
place, but proceed constantly towards the same side in as straight a
line as possible, without changing their direction for slight reasons,
although perhaps it might be chance alone which at first determined the
selection; for in this way, if they do not exactly reach the point they
desire, they will come at least in the end to some place that will
probably be preferable to the middle of a forest. In the same way,
since in action it frequently happens that no delay is permissible, it
is very certain that, when it is not in our power to determine what is
true, we ought to act according to what is most probable; and even
although we should not remark a greater probability in one opinion than
in another, we ought notwithstanding to choose one or the other, and
afterwards consider it, in so far as it relates to practice, as no
longer dubious, but manifestly true and certain, since the reason by
which our choice has been determined is itself possessed of these
qualities. This principle was sufficient thenceforward to rid me of all
those repentings and pangs of remorse that usually disturb the
consciences of such feeble and uncertain minds as, destitute of any
clear and determinate principle of choice, allow themselves one day to
adopt a course of action as the best, which they abandon the next, as
the opposite.