Selections from the Principles of Philosophy — Descartes — John Shaqi
Selections from the Principles of Philosophy
Descartes · en
they have remarked in the kind in vogue up to the present time, that
they cannot apply themselves to the search after truth.
But, in conclusion, if the difference discernible between the
principles in question and those of every other system, and the
great array of truths deducible from them, lead them to discern the
importance of continuing the search after these truths, and to
observe the degree of wisdom, the perfection and felicity of life,
to which they are fitted to conduct us, I venture to believe that
there will not be found one who is not ready to labour hard in so
profitable a study, or at least to favour and aid with all his might
those who shall devote themselves to it with success.
The height of my wishes is, that posterity may sometime behold the
happy issue of it, etc.
TO THE MOST SERENE PRINCESS,
ELIZABETH, ELDEST DAUGHTER OF FREDERICK, KING OF BOHEMIA, COUNT
PALATINE, AND ELECTOR OF THE SACRED ROMAN EMPIRE.
MADAM,--The greatest advantage I have derived from the writings
which I have already published, has arisen from my having, through
means of them, become known to your Highness, and thus been
privileged to hold occasional converse with one in whom so many rare
and estimable qualities are united, as to lead me to believe I
should do service to the public by proposing them as an example to
posterity. It would ill become me to flatter, or to give expression
to anything of which I had no certain knowledge, especially in the
first pages of a work in which I aim at laying down the principles
of truth. And the generous modesty that is conspicuous in all your
actions, assures me that the frank and simple judgment of a man who
only writes what he believes will be more agreeable to you than the
ornate laudations of those who have studied the art of compliment.
For this reason, I will give insertion to nothing in this letter for
which I have not the certainty both of experience and reason; and in
the exordium, as in the rest of the work, I will write only as
becomes a philosopher. There is a vast difference between real and
apparent virtues; and there is also a great discrepancy between
those real virtues that proceed from an accurate knowledge of the
truth, and such as are accompanied with ignorance or error. The
virtues I call apparent are only, properly speaking, vices, which,
as they are less frequent than the vices that are opposed to them,
and are farther removed from them than the intermediate virtues, are
usually held in higher esteem than those virtues. Thus, because
those who fear dangers too much are more numerous than they who fear
them too little, temerity is frequently opposed to the vice of
timidity, and taken for a virtue, and is commonly more highly
esteemed than true fortitude. Thus, also, the prodigal are in
ordinary more praised than the liberal; and none more easily acquire
a great reputation for piety than the superstitious and
hypocritical. With regard to true virtues, these do not all proceed