And then, tho these _Ideas depend not_ on my _will_, it does not therefore follow that they _necessarily proceed_ from _things external_. For as, Altho those _Inclinations_ (which I but now mention’d) are in me, yet they seem _distinct_ and _different_ from my _will_; so perhaps there may be in me some other _faculty_ (to me _unknown_) which may prove the _Efficient cause_ of these _Ideas_, as hitherto I have observed them to be formed in me whilst I _dream_, without the help of any _External Object_. And last of all, tho they should _proceed_ from things which are _different_ from me, it does not therefore follow that they must be _like_ those things. For often times I have found the _thing_ and the _Idea differing_ much. As for example, I find in my self two divers _Ideas_ of the Sun, _one_ as _received_ by my _senses_ (and which cheifly I reckon among those I call adventitious) by which it appears to me very _smal_, * _another_ as taken from the arguments of Astronomers (that is to say, _consequentially collected_, or some other ways made by me from certain _natural notions_) by which ’tis rendred something bigger then the Globe of the Earth. Certainly both of these cannot be _like_ that sun which is _without me_, and my reason perswades me, that that _Idea_ is most _unlike_ the Sun, which seems to _proceed Immediately_ from it self. All which things sufficiently prove, that I have hitherto (not from a _true judgement_, but from a _blind impulse_) beleived that there are certain things _different_ from my self, and which have sent their _Ideas_ or _Images_ into me by the Organs of my _senses_, or some other way. But I have yet an other Way of inquiring, whether any of those Things (whose _Ideas_ I have _within_ Me) are Really Existent _without_ Me; And that is Thus: As those _Ideas_ are only _Modes_ of _Thinking_, I acknowledge no _Inequality_ between them, and they all proceed from me in the _same Manner_. But as _one_ Represents _one thing_, an _other_, an _other Thing_, ’tis Evident there is a _Great difference_ between them. * For without doubt, Those of them which Represent _Substances_ are something _More_, or (as I may say) have _More_ of _Objective Reallity_ in them, then those that Represent only _Modes_ or _Accidents_; and again, _That_ by Which I understand a _Mighty God_, _Eternal_, _Infinite_, _Omniscient_, _Omnipotent Creatour_ of all things besides himself, has certainly in it _more Objective Reallity_, then Those _Ideas_ by which _Finite Substances_ are Exhibited. But Now, it is evident by the _Light_ of _Nature_ that there must be _as much_ at least in the _Total efficient Cause_, as there is in the _Effect_ of _that Cause_; For from Whence can the _effect_ have its _Reallity_, but from the _Cause_? and how can the _Cause_ give it that _Reallity_, unless _it self have_ it?