Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
2. _The Philosophy of Gotama and Canade_. The philosophy of Gotama and
that of Canade belong to one another.[18] The philosophy of Gotama is
called Nyaya (reasoning), and that of Canade, Vaiseshica (particular).
The first is a specially perfect dialectic, and the second, on the
other hand, occupies itself with physics, that is, with particular or
sensuous objects. Colebrooke says:—“No department of science or of
literature has taken up the attention of the Indians more than the
Nyaya; and the fruit of this study is an infinite number of writings,
included in which there may be found the works of very celebrated
men of learning. The system which Gotama and Canade observe is that
indicated in one part of the Vedas as being the path which must be
trodden in the pursuit of learning and study; viz., enunciation,
definition, and investigation. Enunciation is the specification of
a thing by its name, that is, by the expression denoting it, as
revelation directs; for language is considered as revealed to man.
Definition sets forth the particular quality which constitutes the
real character of a thing. Investigation consists in an inquiry into
the adequacy and sufficiency of the definition. In conformity with
this, the teachers of philosophy presuppose scientific terms, proceed
to definitions and then come to the investigation of the thus premised
subjects.” By the name, the ordinary conception is indicated, and with
it what is given in definition is compared in investigation. What comes
next is the object to be contemplated. “Gotama here adduces sixteen
points, amongst which proof, evidence” (which is formal), “and what has
to be proved, are the principal; the others are merely subsidiary and
accessory, as contributing to the knowledge and confirmation of the
truth. The Nyaya concurs with the other psychological schools in this,
that it promises happiness, final excellence, and freedom from evil as
the reward of a perfect knowledge of the principles which it teaches,
that is to say, of the Truth, meaning the conviction of the eternal
existence of the soul as separable from body,” which makes spirit
independent. Soul then is itself the object which is to be known and
proved. This has still to be shown more particularly.
_a._ The first point of importance, the evidence brought forth
as proof, is said to be divided into four kinds:—first of all,
perception; secondly, inference, of which there are three kinds,
viz. inference from result to cause, that from cause to effect, and
that derived from analogy. The third kind of evidence is comparison,
the fourth, trustworthy authority, including both tradition and the
revelation implied in it. These kinds of proof are much brought
forward, both in the ancient Treatise ascribed to Gotama and in
innumerable commentaries.