Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
for the commonwealth, and for use in case of war. I am not angry that
thou hast disclosed my project. For thou didst it more out of love to
the people than hate against me, and because thou didst not know how I
would conduct my rule. For if thou hadst known this, thou wouldst have
submitted to it willingly, and wouldst not have taken flight;” and so
he goes on. Solon, in the answer given by Diogenes, (I. 66, 67) says,
that he “has not a personal grudge against Pisistratus, and he must
call him the best of tyrants; but to turn back does not befit him. For
he made equality of rights essential in the Athenian constitution, and
himself refused the tyranny. By his return he would condone what was
done by Pisistratus.” The rule of Pisistratus accustomed the Athenians
to the laws of Solon, and brought them into usage, so that after this
usage came to be general, supremacy was superfluous; his sons were
hence driven out of Athens, and for the first time the constitution of
Solon upheld itself. Solon undoubtedly gave the laws, but it is another
thing to make such regulations effectual in the manners, habits and
life of a people. What was separate in Solon and Pisistratus, we find
united in Periander in Corinth, and Pittacus in Mitilene.
This may be enough about the outward life of the seven sages. They are
also famed for the wisdom of the sayings which have been preserved to
us; these sayings seem in great measure, however, to be superficial
and hackneyed. The reason for this is found in the fact that, to
our reflection, general propositions are quite usual; much in the
Proverbs of Solomon seems to us to be superficial and commonplace
for the same reason. But it is quite another thing to bring to the
ordinary conception for the first time this same universal in the
form of universality. Many distichs are ascribed to Solon which we
still retain; their object is to express in maxims general obligations
towards the gods, the family and the country. Diogenes (I. 58) tells us
that Solon said: “Laws are like a spider’s web; the small are caught,
the great tear it up: speech is the image of action,” &c. Such sayings
are not philosophy, but general reflections, the expression of moral
duties, maxims, necessary determinations. The wisdom of the sages is
of this kind; many sayings are insignificant, but many seem to be more
insignificant than they are. For instance, Chilon says: “Stand surety,
and evil awaits thee” (_ἐγγύα, πάρα δ̓ ἄτα_). On the one hand this is
quite a common rule of life and prudence, but the sceptics gave to
this proposition a much higher universal significance, which is also
accredited to Chilon. This sense is, “Ally thyself closely to any
particular thing, and unhappiness will fall upon thee.” The sceptics
adduced this proposition independently, as demonstrating the principle
of scepticism, which is that nothing is finite and definite in and for
itself, being only a fleeting, vacillating phase which does not last.