Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
This universal stands in direct relationship to the particular
and to the existence of the world as manifested. The first thing
implied in what has been said, is that the particular existence
has no independence, is not true in and for itself, but is only an
accidental modification. But the affirmative point of view is that all
other things proceed from the one, that the one remains thereby the
substance from which all other things proceed, and it is only through
a determination which is accidental and external that the particular
existence has its being. It is similarly the case that all particular
existence is transient, that is, it loses the form of particular and
again becomes the universal, water. The simple proposition of Thales
therefore, is Philosophy, because in it water, though sensuous, is not
looked at in its particularity as opposed to other natural things, but
as Thought in which everything is resolved and comprehended. Thus we
approach the divorce of the absolute from the finite; but it is not
to be thought that the unity stands above, and that down here we have
the finite world. This idea is often found in the common conception
of God—where permanence is attributed to the world and where men
often represent two kinds of actuality to themselves, a sensuous and a
supersensuous world of equal standing. The philosophic point of view is
that the one is alone the truly actual, and here we must take actual in
its higher significance, because we call everything actual in common
life. The second circumstance to be remembered is that with the ancient
philosophers, the principle has a definite and, at first, a physical
form. To us this does not appear to be philosophic but only physical;
in this case, however, matter has philosophic significance. Thales’
theory is thus a natural philosophy, because this universal essence
is determined as real; consequently the Absolute is determined as the
unity of thought and Being.
2. Now if we have this undifferentiated principle predominating, the
question arises as to the determination of this first principle. The
transition from universal to particular at once becomes essential, and
it begins with the determination of activity; the necessity for such
arises here. That which is to be a veritable principle must not have
a one-sided, particular form, but in it the difference must itself
be absolute, while other principles are only special kinds of forms.
The fact that the Absolute is what determines itself is already more
concrete; we have the activity and the higher self-consciousness of the
spiritual principle, by which the form has worked itself into being
absolute form, the totality of form. Since it is most profound, this
comes latest; what has first to be done is merely to look at things as
determined.