Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
Secondly, Aristotle says (Metaph. I. 3): “From this it may be seen
that first cause has only been by all these expressed in the form of
matter. But because they proceeded thus, the thing itself opened out
their way for them, and forced them into further investigation. For
whether origin and decay are derived from one or more, the question
alike arises, ‘How does it happen and what is the cause of it?’ For
the fundamental substance (_τὸ ὑποκείμενον_) does not make itself to
change, just as neither wood nor metal are themselves the cause of
change; wood neither forms a bed nor does brass a statue, but something
else is the cause of the change. To investigate this, however, is
to investigate the other principle, which, as we would say, is the
Principle of Motion.” This criticism holds good even now, where the
Absolute is represented as the one fixed substance. Aristotle says
that change is not conceivable out of matter as such, or out of water
not itself having motion; he reproaches the older philosophers for
the fact that they have not investigated the principle of motion for
which men care most. Further, object is altogether absent; there is no
determination of activity. Hence Aristotle says in the former passage:
“In that they undertake to give the cause of origin and decay, they in
fact remove the cause of movement. Because they make the principle to
be a simple body (earth being excepted), they do not comprehend the
mutual origination and decay whereby the one arises out of the other:
I am here referring to water, air, fire, and earth. This origination
is to be shown as separation or as union, and hence the contradiction
comes about that one in time comes earlier than the other. That is,
because this kind of origination is the method which they have adopted,
the way taken is from the simple universal, through the particular, to
the individual as what comes latest. Water, air, and fire are, however,
universal. Fire seems to be most suitable for this element, seeing that
it is the most subtle. Thus those who made it to be the principle, most
adequately gave expression to this method (_λόγῳ_) of origination; and
others thought very similarly. For else why should no one have made the
earth an element, in conformity with the popular idea? Hesiod says that
it was the original body—so ancient and so common was this idea. But
what in Becoming comes later, is the first in nature.” However, these
philosophers did not understand this so, because they were ruled by the
process of Becoming only, without again sublating it, or knowing that
first formal universal as such, and manifesting the third, the totality
or unity of matter and form, as essence. Here, we see, the Absolute is
not yet the self-determining, the Notion turned back into itself, but
only a dead abstraction; the moderns were the first, says Aristotle,
(Metaph. I. 6; III. 3) to understand the fundamental principle more in
the form of genus.