Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
first philosophy, is superseded on account of its mysterious nature.
Plato, Speusippus, Aristotle, &c., have stolen the fruits of their work
from the Pythagoreans by making a simple use of their principle.” In
this passage a perfect knowledge of numbers is evident.
The enigmatic character of the determination through number is what
most engages our attention. The numbers of arithmetic answers to
thought-determinations, for number has the “one” as element and
principle; the one, however, is a category of being-for-self, and
thus of identity with self, in that it excludes all else and is
indifferent to what is “other.” The further determinations of number
are only further combinations and repetitions of the one, which all
through remains fixed and external; number, thus, is the most utterly
dead, notionless continuity possible; it is an entirely external and
mechanical process, which is without necessity. Hence number is not
immediate Notion, but only a beginning of thought, and a beginning in
the worst possible way; it is the Notion in its extremest externality,
in quantitative form, and in that of indifferent distinction. In so
far, the one has within itself both the principle of thought and
that of materiality, or the determination of the sensuous. In order
that anything should have the form of Notion, it must immediately in
itself, as determined, relate itself to its opposite, just as positive
is related to negative; and in this simple movement of the Notion we
find the ideality of differences and negation of independence to be
the chief determination. On the other hand, in the number three, for
instance, there are always three units, of which each is independent;
and this is what constitutes both their defect and their enigmatic
character. For since the essence of the Notion is innate, numbers are
the most worthless instruments for expressing Notion-determinations.