Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
א. “There are three methods of thinking things; firstly, in accordance
with diversity, secondly, with opposition, and thirdly, according
to relation. (_αα_) What is considered in its mere diversity, is
considered for itself; this is the case with those subjects in which
each relates only to itself, such as horse, plant, earth, air, water
and fire. Such matters are thought of as detached and not in relation
to others.” This is the determination of identity with self or of
independence. (_ββ_) “In reference to opposition, the one is determined
as evidently contrasting with the other; we have examples of this in
good and evil, right and wrong, sacred and profane, rest and movement,
&c. (_γγ_) According to relation (_πρός τι_), we have the object
which is determined in accordance with its relationship to others,
such as right and left, over and under, double and half. One is only
comprehensible from the other; for I cannot tell which is my left
excepting by my right.” Each of these relations in its opposition,
is likewise set up for itself in a position of independence. “The
difference between relationship and opposition is that in opposition
the coming into existence of the ‘one’ is at the expense of the
‘other,’ and conversely. If motion is taken away, rest commences; if
motion begins, rest ceases; if health is taken away, sickness begins,
and conversely. In a condition of relationship, on the contrary, both
take their rise, and both similarly cease together; if the right
is removed, so also is the left; the double goes and the half is
destroyed.” What is here taken away is taken not only as regards its
opposition, but also in its existence. “A second difference is that
what is in opposition has no middle; for example, between sickness and
health, life and death, rest and motion, there is no third. Relativity,
on the contrary, has a middle, for between larger and smaller there
is the like; and between too large and too small the right size is
the medium.” Pure opposition passes through nullity to opposition;
immediate extremes, on the other hand, subsist in a third or middle
state, but in such a case no longer as opposed. This exposition shows
a certain regard for universal, logical determinations, which now and
always have the greatest possible importance, and are moments in all
conceptions and in everything that is. The nature of these opposites
is, indeed, not considered here, but it is of importance that they
should be brought to consciousness.