Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
c. The triad (_τριάς_) has now become a most important number,
seeing that in it the monad has reached reality and perfection. The
monad proceeds through the duad, and again brought into unity with
this undetermined manifold, it is the triad. Unity and multiplicity
are present in the triad in the worst possible way—as an external
combination; but however abstractly this is understood, the triad
is still a profound form. The triad then is held to be the first
perfect form in the universal. Aristotle (De Cœlo I. 1) puts this
very clearly: “The corporeal has no dimension outside of the Three;
hence the Pythagoreans also say that the all and everything is
determined through triplicity,” that is, it has absolute form. “For
the number of the whole has end, middle, and beginning; and this
is the triad.” Nevertheless there is something superficial in the
wish to bring everything under it, as is done in the systematization
of the more modern natural philosophy. “Therefore we, too, taking
this determination from nature, make use of it in the worship of the
gods, so that we believe them to have been properly apostrophized
only when we have called upon them three times in prayer. Two we call
both, but not all; we speak first of three as all. What is determined
through three is the first totality (_πᾶν_); what is in triple form
is perfectly divided. Some is merely in one, other is only in two,
but this is All.” What is perfect, or has reality, is its identity,
opposition and unity, like number generally; but in triplicity this
is actual, because it has beginning, middle, and end. Each thing is
simple as beginning; it is other or manifold as middle, and its end
is the return of its other nature into unity or mind; if we take this
triplicity from a thing, we negate it and make of it an abstract
construction of thought.
It is now comprehensible that Christians sought and found the Trinity
in this threefold nature. It has often been made a superficial reason
for objecting to them; sometimes the idea of the Trinity as it was
present to the ancients, was considered as above reason, as a secret,
and hence, too high; sometimes it was deemed too absurd. But from the
one cause or from the other, they did not wish to bring it into closer
relation to reason. If there is a meaning in this Trinity, we must try
to understand it. It would be an anomalous thing if there were nothing
in what has for two thousand years been the holiest Christian idea; if
it were too holy to be brought down to the level of reason, or were
something now quite obsolete, so that it would be contrary to good
taste and sense to try to find a meaning in it. It is the Notion of the
Trinity alone of which we can speak, and not of the idea of Father and
Son, for we am not dealing with these natural relationships.