Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
With this the dialectic reasoning of the Eleatics is closely connected
in respect that they have also proved that nothing can originate or
pass away. This deduction is to be found in Aristotle’s work, De
Xenophane, Zenone et Gorgia, c. 3. “It is impossible, he says,[49] that
if anything is, it arises (and he even applies this to the Godhead);
for it must arise either from the like or from the unlike. But both are
equally impossible: for it is no more probable that the like should be
engendered from the like, than that it should engender it, for the like
must have determinations identical with one another.” In acknowledging
similarity, the distinction between begetting and begotten falls away.
“Just as little can unlike arise from unlike, for if from the weaker
the stronger takes its rise; or from the smaller, the greater; or from
the worse, the better: or if, conversely, the worse proceeds from the
better, non-being would result from Being: this is impossible, and thus
God is eternal.” The same thing has been expressed as Pantheism or
Spinozaism, which rests on the proposition _ex nihilo fit nihil_. The
unity of God is further proved by Xenophanes: “If God is the mightiest,
He must be One; for were He two or more, He would not have dominion
over the others, but, not having dominion over the others, He could not
be God. Thus were there several, they would be relatively more powerful
or weaker, and thus they would not be gods, for God’s nature is to have
nothing mightier than He. Were they equal, God would no longer possess
the quality of being the mightiest, for the like is neither worse nor
better than the like”—or it does not differ therefrom. “Hence if
God is, and is such as this, He is only one; He could not, were there
several, do what He willed. Since He is one, He is everywhere alike.
He hears, sees and has also the other senses everywhere, for were this
not the case, the parts of God would be one more powerful than the
other, which is impossible. Since God is everywhere alike, He has a
spherical form, for He is not here thus and elsewhere different, but is
everywhere the same. Since He is eternal and one and spherical in form,
He is neither unlimited nor limited. To be unlimited is non-being;
for that has neither middle, beginning, end, nor part; and what is
unlimited corresponds to this description. But whatever non-being is,
Being is not. Mutual limitation would take place if there were several,
but since there is only One, it is not limited. The one does not move
itself, nor is it unmoved; to be unmoved is non-being, for to it none
other comes, nor does it go into another; but to be moved must mean to
be several, for one must move into another. Thus the One neither rests
nor is it moved, for it is neither non-being nor is it many. In all
this God is thus indicated; He is eternal and One, like Himself and
spherical, neither unlimited nor limited, neither at rest nor moved.”