Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
What specially characterizes Zeno is the dialectic which, properly
speaking, begins with him; he is the master of the Eleatic school in
whom its pure thought arrives at the movement of the Notion in itself
and becomes the pure soul of science. That is to say, in the Eleatics
hitherto considered, we only have the proposition: “The nothing has
no reality and is not at all, and thus what is called origin and
decease disappears.” With Zeno, on the contrary, we certainly see just
such an assertion of the one and removal of what contradicts it, but
we also see that this assertion is not made the starting point; for
reason begins by calmly demonstrating in that which is established as
existent, its negation. Parmenides asserts that “The all is immutable,
for, in change, the non-being of that which is would be asserted,
but Being only is; in saying that non-being is, the subject and the
predicate contradict themselves.” Zeno, on the other hand, says:
“Assert your change; in it as change there is the negation to it, or
it is nothing.” To the former change existed as motion, definite and
complete. Zeno protested against motion as such, or pure motion. “Pure
Being is not motion; it is rather the negation of motion.” We find it
specially interesting that there is in Zeno the higher consciousness,
the consciousness that when one determination is denied, this negation
is itself again a determination, and then in the absolute negation
not one determination, but both the opposites must be negated. Zeno
anticipated this, and because he foresaw that Being is the opposite
of nothing, he denied of the One what must be said of the nothing.
But the same thing must occur with all the rest. We find this higher
dialectic in Plato’s Parmenides; here it only breaks forth in respect
to some determinations, and not to the determination of the One and of
Being. The higher consciousness is the consciousness of the nullity of
Being as of what is determined as against the nothing, partly found in
Heraclitus and then in the Sophists; with them it never has any truth,
it has no existence in itself, but is only the for-another, or the
assurance of the individual consciousness, and assurance as refutation,
i.e. the negative side of dialectic.