Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
_a._ Understanding the abstract process as time, Heraclitus said:
“Time is the first corporeal existence,” as Sextus (adv. Math. X. 231,
232) puts it. Corporeal is an unfortunate expression; the Sceptics
frequently pick out the crudest expressions or make thoughts crude
in the first place so that they may afterwards dispense with them.
Corporeal here means abstract sensuousness; time, as the first sensuous
existence, is the abstract representation of process. It is because
Heraclitus did not rest at the logical expression of Becoming, but gave
to his principle the form of the existent, that it was necessary that
time should first present itself to him as such; for in the sensuously
perceptible it is the first form of Becoming. Time is pure Becoming
as perceived, the pure Notion, that which is simple, and the harmony
issuing from absolute opposites; its essential nature is to be and not
to be in one unity, and besides this, it has no other character. It is
not that time _is_ or _is not_, for time _is_ non-being immediately in
Being and Being immediately in non-being: it is the transition out of
Being into non-being, the abstract Notion, but in an objective form,
i.e. in so far as it is for us. In time there is no past and future,
but only the now, and this is, but is not as regards the past; and this
non-being, as future, turns round into Being. If we were to say how
that which Heraclitus recognized as principle, might, in the pure form
in which he recognized it, exist for consciousness, we could mention
nothing else but time; and it quite accords with the principle of
thought in Heraclitus to define time as the first form of Becoming.
_b._ But this pure, objective Notion must realize itself more fully,
and thus we find in fact, that Heraclitus determined the process in a
more markedly physical manner. In time we have the moments of Being and
non-being manifested as negative only, or as vanishing immediately;
if we wish to express both these moments as one independent totality,
the question is asked, which physical existence corresponds to this
determination. To Heraclitus the truth is to have grasped the essential
being of nature, i.e. to have represented it as implicitly infinite,
as process in itself; and consequently it is evident to us that
Heraclitus could not say that the primary principle is air, water, or
any such thing. They are not themselves process, but fire is process;
and thus he maintains fire to be the elementary principle, and this is
the real form of the Heraclitean principle, the soul and substance of
the nature-process. Fire is physical time, absolute unrest, absolute
disintegration of existence, the passing away of the “other,” but also
of itself; and hence we can understand how Heraclitus, proceeding from
his fundamental determination, could quite logically call fire the
Notion of the process.