Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
Empedocles also speaks of the process of these elements, but he did not
comprehend it further; the point to be remarked is that he represented
their unity as a combination. In this synthetic union, which is a
superficial relation devoid of Notion, being partly related and partly
unrelated, the contradiction necessarily results that at one time the
unity of elements is established and at another, their separation:
the unity is not the universal unity in which they are moments,
being even in their diversity one, and in their unity different, for
these two moments, unity and diversity, fall asunder, and union and
separation are quite indeterminate relationships. Empedocles says in
the first book of his poem on Nature, as given by Sturz (p. 517, v.
106-109): “There is no such thing as a Nature, only a combination and
separation of what is combined; it is merely called Nature by men.”
That is to say, that which constitutes anything, as being its elements
or parts, is not as yet called its nature, but only its determinate
unity. For example, the nature of an animal is its constant and real
determinateness, its kind, its universality, which is simple. But
Empedocles does away with nature in this sense, for every thing,
according to him, is the combination of simple elements, and thus
not in itself the universal, simple and true: this is not what is
signified by us when we speak of nature. Now this nature in which a
thing moves in accordance with its own end, Aristotle (De gen. et
corr. II. 6) misses in Empedocles; in later times this conception was
still further lost. Because the elements were thus existent simply in
themselves, there was, properly speaking, no process established in
them, for in process they are only vanishing moments, and not existent
in themselves. Being thus implicit, they must have been unchangeable,
or they could not constitute themselves into a unity; for in the one
their subsistence, or their implicit existence would be destroyed. But
because Empedocles says that things subsist from these elements, he
immediately establishes their unity.
These are the principal points in Empedocles’ philosophy. I will quote
the remarks that Aristotle (Met. I. 4) makes in this regard.