Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
1. _The Universal Principle._ The logical principle of Anaxagoras was
that he recognized the _νοῦς_ as the simple, absolute essence of the
world. The simplicity of the _νοῦς_ is not a Being but a universality
which is distinguished from itself, though in such a way that the
distinction is immediately sublated and the identity is set forth for
itself. This universal for itself, sundered, exists in purity only
as thought; it exists also in nature as objective existence, but in
that case no longer purely for itself, but as having particularity as
an immediate in it. Space and time are, for example, the most ideal,
universal facts in nature as such, but there is no pure space, no pure
time and motion any more than any pure matter—for this universal is
immediately defined space, air, earth, &c. In thought, when I say, I
am I, or I = I, I certainly distinguish something from me, but the
pure unity remains; there is no movement but a distinction which is
not distinguished, or the being-for-me. And in all that I think, if
the thought has a definite content, it is my thought: I am thus known
to myself in this object. This universal which thus exists for itself
and the individual, or thought and being, thus, however, come into
definite opposition. Here the speculative unity of this universal with
the individual should be considered as it is posited as absolute unity,
but the comprehension of the Notion itself is certainly not found
with the ancients. We need not expect a pure Notion such as one of an
understanding realizing itself into a system, organized as a universe.