Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
With this principle comes the determination of an understanding as of
self-determining activity; this has hitherto been wanting, for the
Becoming of Heraclitus, which is only process, is not yet as fate,
the independently self-determining. By this we must not represent
to ourselves subjective thought; in thinking we think immediately
of our thought as it is in consciousness. Here, on the contrary,
quite objective thought is meant, active understanding—as we say,
there is reason in the world, or we speak of genera in nature which
are the universal. The genus animal is the substantial of the dog;
the dog itself is this; the laws of nature are themselves nature’s
immanent essence. The nature is not formed from without as men
make a table; this is also made with understanding, but through an
understanding outside of this wood. This external form, which is
called the understanding, immediately occurs to us in speaking of
the understanding; but here the universal is meant, that which is
the immanent nature of the object itself. The _νοῦς_ is thus not a
thinking existence from without which regulates the world; by such
the meaning present to Anaxagoras would be quite destroyed and all
its philosophic interest taken away. For to speak of an individual,
a unit from without, is to fall into the ordinary conception and its
dualism; a so-called thinking principle is no longer a thought, but is
a subject. But still the true universal is for all that not abstract,
but the universal is just the determining in and out of itself of the
particular in and for itself. In this activity, which is independently
self-determining, the fact is at once implied that the activity,
because it constitutes process, retains itself as the universal
self-identical. Fire, which, according to Heraclitus, was process,
dies away and merely passes over, without independent existence, into
the opposite; it is certainly also a circle and a return to fire, but
the principle does not retain itself in its determinateness as the
universal, seeing that a simple passing into the opposite takes place.
This relation to itself in determination which we see appearing in
Anaxagoras, now, however, contains the determination of the universal
though it is not formally expressed, and therein we have the end or the
Good.