Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
Thus this self-determining activity, which is then active on something
else, enters into opposition, but it again negates the opposition,
governs it, in it reflects upon itself; it is the end, the thought,
that which conserves itself in its self-determination. The development
of these moments is the business of Philosophy from henceforth. But
if we look more closely as to how far Anaxagoras has got in the
development of this thought, we find nothing further than the activity
determining from out of itself, which sets up a limit or measure;
further than the determination of measure, development does not go.
Anaxagoras gives us no more concrete definition of the _νοῦς_, and
this we are still left to consider; we thus have nothing more than the
abstract determination of the concrete in itself. The above-mentioned
predicates which Anaxagoras gives the _νοῦς_, may thus indeed be
affirmed, but they are, on their own account, one-sided only.
2. _The Homœomeriæ._ This is the one side in the principle of
Anaxagoras; we now have to consider the going forth of the _νοῦς_
into further determinations. This remaining part of the philosophy of
Anaxagoras at first, however, makes us think that the hopes in which
such a principle justified us must be very much diminished. On the
other side, this universal is confronted by Being, matter, the manifold
generally, potentiality as distinguished from the former as actuality.
For if the Good or the end is also determined as potentiality, the
universal, as the self-moving, may rather be called the actual in
itself, the being-for-self, as opposed to implicit being, potentiality,
passivity. Aristotle says in an important passage (Met. I. 8): “If
any one should say of Anaxagoras that he adopted two principles,
he would rest his statement on a point respecting which the latter
never really clearly defined himself, but which he had necessarily
to acknowledge to those who adduced it.... That is, Anaxagoras says
that originally everything is mingled.... But where nothing is yet
separated, no distinguishing feature is present; such substance is
neither a white, black, gray, nor any other colour, but colourless; it
has no quality nor quantity nor determination (_τί_). All is mingled
except the _νοῦς_; this is unmingled and pure. With this in view, it
thus occurs to him to denominate as principles the one, for it alone is
single and unmingled, and the other-being (_θάτερον_), what we call the
indeterminate, before it has become determined or partakes of any kind
of form.”