Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
of the heavens and the hill Albordi, and over the earth too, until
the third age was reached. Then Ahriman, whose kingdom of night was
formerly bound beneath the earth, broke in upon Ormuzd’s corporeal
world and ruled in common with him. Now the space between heaven and
earth was divided into light and night. As Ormuzd had formerly only a
spiritual kingdom of light, Ahriman had only one of night, but now that
they were intermingled he placed the terrestrial light thus created in
opposition to the terrestrial night. From this time on, two corporeal
worlds stand opposed, one pure and good, and one impure and evil, and
this opposition permeates all nature. On Albordi, Ormuzd created Mithra
as mediator for the earth. The end of the creation of the bodily world
is none other than to reinstate existence, fallen from its creator,
to make it good again, and thus to make the evil disappear for ever.
The bodily world is the battle-ground between good and evil; but the
battle between light and darkness is not in itself an absolute and
irreconcilable opposition, but one which can be conquered, and in it
Ormuzd, the principle of Light, will be the conqueror.
I would remark of this, that when we consider the elements in these
ideas which bear some further connection with Philosophy, the universal
of that duality with which the Notion is necessarily set forth can
alone be interesting and noteworthy to us; for in it the Notion is just
the immediate opposite of itself, the unity of itself with itself in
the “other:” a simple existence in which absolute opposition appears
as the opposition of existence, and the sublation of that opposition.
Because properly the Light principle is the only existence of both, and
the principle of Darkness is the null and void,—the principle of Light
identifies itself with Mithra, which was before called the highest
existence. The opposition has laid aside the appearance of contingency,
but the spiritual principle is not separate from the physical, because
the good and evil are both determined as Light and Darkness. We thus
here see thought breaking forth from actuality, and yet not such a
separation as only takes place in Religion, when the supersensuous
is itself again represented in a manner sensuous, notionless and
dispersed, for the whole of what is dispersed in sensuous form is
gathered together in the one single opposition, and activity is thus
simply represented. These determinations lie much nearer to Thought;
they are not mere images or symbols, but yet these myths do not concern
Philosophy. In them Thought does not take the first place, for the
myth-form remains predominant. In all religions this oscillation
between form and thought is found, and such a combination still lies
outside Philosophy.