Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 1 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
The Greek world got as far as this Idea, since they formed an ideal
intellectual world; and this was done by the Alexandrian Philosophy,
in which the Greek Philosophy perfected itself and reached its end.
If we wish to represent this process figuratively, _A._ Thought, is
(_α_) speaking generally abstract, as in universal or absolute space,
by which empty space is often understood; (_β_) then the most simple
space determinations appear, in which we commence with the point in
order that we may arrive at the line and angle; (_γ_) what comes third
is their union into the triangle, that which is indeed concrete, but
which is still retained in this abstract element of surface, and
thus is only the first and still formal totality and limitation which
corresponds to the _νοῦς_. _B._ The next point is, that since we allow
each of the enclosing lines of the triangle to be again surface, each
forms itself into the totality of the triangle and into the whole
figure to which it belongs; that is the realization of the whole in the
sides as we see it in Scepticism or Stoicism. _C._ The last stage of
all is, that these surfaces or sides of the triangle join themselves
into a body or a totality; the body is for the first time the perfect
spacial determination, and that is a reduplication of the triangle.
But in as far as the triangle which forms the basis is outside of the
pyramid, this simile does not hold good.
Grecian Philosophy in the Neo-platonists finds its end in a perfect
kingdom of Thought and of bliss, and in a potentially existent world
of the ideal, which is yet unreal because the whole only exists in the
element of universality. This world still lacks individuality as such,
which is an essential moment in the Notion; actuality demands that in
the identity of both sides of the Idea, the independent totality shall
be also posited as negative. Through this self-existent negation, which
is absolute subjectivity, the Idea is first raised into Mind. Mind is
the subjectivity of self-knowledge; but it is only Mind inasmuch as
it knows what is object to itself, and that is itself, as a totality,
and is for itself a totality. That is to say, the two triangles which
are above and below in the prism must not be two in the sense of being
doubled, but they must be one intermingled unity. Or, in the case of
body, the difference arises between the centre and the peripheral
parts. This opposition of real corporeality and centre as the simple
existence, now makes its appearance, and the totality is the union of
the centre and the substantial—not, however, the simple union, but a
union such that the subjective knows itself as subjective in relation
to the objective and substantial. Hence the Idea is this totality,
and the Idea which knows itself is essentially different from the
substantial; the former manifests itself independently, but in such a
manner that as such it is considered to be for itself substantial. The