Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
Aristotle further says on this subject (Metaph. XII. 6): “It may be
that what has potentiality is not real; it is of no avail therefore to
make substances eternal, as the idealists do, if they do not contain a
principle which can effect change. And even this is insufficient, if it
is not active, because in that case there is no change. Yea, even if
it were active, but its substance only a potentiality, there would be
in it no eternal movement, for it is possible that what is according
to potentiality may not exist. We must therefore have a principle
whose substance must be apprehended as activity.” Thus in mind energy
is substance itself. “But here a doubt seems to spring up. For all
that is active seems to be possible, but all that is possible does
not seem to energize, so that potentiality seems to be antecedent,”
for it is the universal. “But if this were the case, no one of the
entities would be in existence, for it is possible that a thing may
possess a capacity of existence, though it has never yet existed.
But energy is higher than potentiality. We must thus not assert, as
theologians would have us do, that in the eternal ages there was first
chaos or night” (matter), “nor must we say with natural philosophers
that everything existed simultaneously. For how could the First be
changed, if nothing in reality were cause? For matter does not move
itself, it is the Master who moves it. Leucippus and Plato accordingly
say that motion has always existed, but they give no reason for the
assertion.” Pure activity is, according to Aristotle (Metaph. IX. 8),
before potentiality, not in relation to time, but to essence. That is
to say, time is a subordinate moment, far removed from the universal;
for the absolute first Being is, as Aristotle says at the end of the
sixth chapter of the twelfth book, “that which in like activity remains
always identical with itself.” In the former assumption of a chaos and
so on, an activity is posited which has to do with something else, not
with itself, and has therefore a pre-supposition; but chaos is only
bare possibility.