Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
that without which the Good does not subsist; thirdly, that which can
exist in no other way than it does, but involves absolute existence.
On such a principle of the unmoved the heavens depend and the whole of
nature”—the visible that is eternal, and the visible that changes. This
system is ever-enduring. “But to us” as individuals, “there is granted,
for a short time only, a sojourn therein of surpassing excellence. For
the system continues ever the same, but for us that is impossible. Now
this activity is in its very self enjoyment, and therefore vigilance,
exercise of the senses, thinking in general, are most productive of
enjoyment; and for the same reason hopes and memories bring pleasure.
But thinking, in its pure essence, is a thinking of that which is
absolutely the most excellent;” the thought is for itself absolute
end. The difference and contradiction in activity and the abrogation
of the same, Aristotle expresses thus: “But thought thinks itself
by participation (μετάληψιν) in that which is thought, but thought
becomes thought by contact and apprehension, so that thought and the
object of thought are the same.” Thought, as being the unmoved which
causes motion, has an object, which, however, becomes transformed into
activity, because its content is itself something thought, _i.e._ a
product of thought, and thus altogether identical with the activity of
thinking. The object of thought is first produced in the activity of
thinking, which in this way separates the thought as an object. Hence,
in thinking, that which is moved and that which moves are the same;
and as the substance of what is thought is thought, what is thought
is the absolute cause which, itself unmoved, is identical with the
thought which is moved by it; the separation and the relation are one
and the same. The chief moment in Aristotle’s philosophy is accordingly
this, that the energy of thinking and the object of thought are the
same; “for thought is that which is receptive of objects of perception
and the existent. When in possession of these it is in a condition
of activity (ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων); and thus all this” operation by which
it thinks itself, “is more divine than the divine possession which
thinking reason supposes itself to have,”—the content of thought. It
is not the object of thought that is the more excellent, but the very
energy of thinking; the activity of apprehension brings that to pass
which appears as something that is being apprehended. “Speculation
(ἡ θεωρία) is thus the most pleasing and the best. If then God has
eternally subsisted in such surpassing excellence as for a limited time
pertains to us” (in whom this eternal Thought, which is God Himself,
occurs only as a particular condition), “He is worthy of admiration;
if He possesses it in a more eminent degree, His nature is still more
admirable. But this is His mode of subsistence. Life is also inherent
in Him, for the activity of thought is life. But He constitutes this