Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
the principle of its form in itself, it does not make itself an axe,
nor does its form, its Notion, in itself constitute its substance, as
its activity is not through itself. “If, for instance, the eye were
in itself a living thing, vision would be its soul, for vision is the
reality which expresses the Notion of the eye. But the eye, as such, is
only the material instrument of vision, for if vision were lost, the
eye would be an eye only in name, like an eye of stone or a painted
eye.” Thus to the question, What is the substance of the eye? Aristotle
answers: Are the nerves, humours, tissues, its substance? On the
contrary, sight itself is its substance, these material substances are
only an empty name. “As this is the case in the part, so it also holds
good of the body as a whole. The potentiality of life is not in any
such thing as has lost its soul, but in that which still possesses it.
The seed or the fruit is such and such a body potentially. Like hewing
and seeing,” in the axe and the eye, “waking” in general “is activity;
but the corporeal is only potentiality. But as the” living “eye is
both vision and the eyeball” (the two being connected as actuality and
potentiality), “so also are soul and body the living animal, the two
are not to be separated. But it is not yet clear whether the soul is
the activity of the body in the same way as the steersman is of the
ship.” That the active form is the true substance, while matter is so
only potentially, is a true speculative Notion.
As settling the question asked in the above-mentioned metaphor, we may
quote what Aristotle says later (De Anima, II. 4): “As the principle of
motion and as end (οὗ ἕνεκα), and as substance of living bodies, the
soul is the cause. For substance is to all objects the cause of their
existence, but life is the existence of the living, and its cause and
principle is the soul; and further, its energy is the existing Notion
of what has potential existence. The soul is cause also as end,” that
is, as self-determining universality, “for nature, like thought, acts
for the sake of an object, which object is its end, but in living
beings this is soul. All the parts of the body are thus the organs of
the soul, and hence exist for its sake.” In like manner Aristotle shows
that the soul is the cause of motion.