Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
The passivity of understanding has therefore here only the sense of
potentiality before actuality, and that is the great principle of
Aristotle; in regard to this he brings forward at the end of the same
chapter another much-decried illustration, which has been just as much
misunderstood as the preceding. “Reason is like a book upon whose
pages nothing is actually written;” that is, however, paper, but not
a book. All Aristotle’s thoughts are overlooked, and only external
illustrations such as this are comprehended. A book on which nothing
is written everyone can understand. And the technical term is the
well-known _tabula rasa_, which is to be found wherever Aristotle is
spoken of: Aristotle is said to have alleged that the mind is a blank
page, on which characters are first traced by external objects, so
that thinking thus comes to it from without.[99] But that is the very
opposite of what Aristotle says. Instead of the Notion being adhered
to, casual comparisons such as these have been caught up here and
there by the imagination, as if they expressed the matter itself.
But Aristotle did not in the least intend that the analogy should be
pushed to its furthest extent: the understanding is of a surety not a
thing, and has not the passivity of a writing-tablet; it is itself the
energy, which is not, as it would be in the case of a tablet, external
to it. The analogy is therefore confined to this, that the soul has a
content only in so far as actual thought is exercised. The soul is this
book unwritten on, and the meaning consequently is that the soul is all
things implicitly, but it is not in itself this totality; it is like
a book that contains all things potentially, but in reality contains
nothing before it is written on. Before real activity nothing truly
exists; or “Understanding itself can enter thought, like the objects
of thought in general. For in that which is without matter” (in mind),
“the thinker” (the subjective) “and the thought” (the objective) “are
the same; theoretical knowledge and that which comes to be known are
the same. In that which is material, thinking is only in potentiality,
so that understanding itself does not belong to it; for understanding
is a potentiality without matter, but the object of thought exists in
it,” while Nature contains the Idea only implicitly. It is plain from
this that the above illustration has been taken in quite a false sense,
utterly contrary to Aristotle’s meaning.