Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
Aristotle then passes through the particular virtues at great length.
Because the virtues, considered as the union of the desiring or
realizing with the rational, have an illogical moment within them,
Aristotle places[105] their principle on the side of feeling in
a mean, so that virtue is the mean between two extremes; _e.g._
liberality is the mean between avarice and prodigality; gentleness
between passion and passive endurance; bravery between rashness and
cowardice; friendship between egotism and self-effacement, &c. For the
good, and specially that good which has to do with the senses, which
would suffer if affected to an excessive degree (_supra_, p. 195), is
therefore a mean, just because the sensuous is an ingredient in it.
This does not appear to be a sufficient definition, and it is merely
a quantitative determination, just because it is not only the Notion
that determines, but the empirical side is also present. Virtue is not
absolutely determined in itself, but likewise has a material element,
the nature of which is capable of a more or a less. Thus if it has been
objected to Aristotle’s definition of virtue as a difference in degree,
that it is unsatisfactory and vague, we may say that this really is
involved in the nature of the thing. Virtue, and determinate virtue in
its entirety, enters into a sphere where that which is quantitative has
a place; thought here is no more as such at home with itself, and the
quantitative limit undetermined. The nature of particular virtues is
of such a kind, that they are capable of no more exact determination;
they can only be spoken of in general, and for them there is no further
determination than just this indefinite one.[106] But in our way of
looking at things, duty is something absolutely existent in itself, and
not a mean between existent extremes through which it is determined;
but this universal likewise results in being empty, or rather
undetermined, while that determinate content is a moment of being that
immediately involves us in conflicting duties. It is in practice that
man seeks a necessity in man as individual, and endeavours to express
it; but it is either formal, or as in particular virtues, a definite
content, which, in so being, falls a prey to empiricism.
β. POLITICS.