Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
disposed and secured. The triumph over this system was thus a triumph
over that principle, and consequently the triumph of free, spontaneous
thought. But another side of this triumph is the triumph of the
commonplace point of view that broke free from the Notion and shook off
the yoke of thought. Formerly, and even nowadays, enough has been heard
of Aristotle’s scholastic subtleties; in using this name, men thought
that they had a right to spare themselves from entering on abstraction,
and, in place of the Notion, they thought that it justified them
in seeing, hearing, and thus making their escape to what is called
healthy human understanding. In science, too, in place of subtle
thoughts, subtle sight has commenced; a beetle or a species of bird is
distinguished with as great minuteness as were formerly conceptions and
thoughts. Such subtleties as whether a species of bird is red or green
in colour, or has a more or less perfect tail, are found more easy than
the differences in thought; and in the meantime, until a people has
educated itself up to the labour of thought, in order to be able thus
to support the universal, the former is a useful preparation, or rather
it is a moment in this course of culture.
But inasmuch as the deficiency in the Aristotelian philosophy rests in
the fact, that after the manifold of phenomena was through it raised
into the Notion, though this last again fell asunder into a succession
of determinate Notions, the unity of the absolute Notion which unites
them was not emphasized, and this is what succeeding time had to
accomplish. What now appears is that the unity of the Notion which is
absolute existence, makes its appearance as necessity, and it presents
itself first as the unity of self-consciousness and consciousness, as
pure thought. The unity of existence as existence is objective unity,
thought, as that which is thought. But unity, as Notion, the implicitly
universal negative unity, time as absolutely fulfilled time, and in its
fulfilment as being unity, is pure self-consciousness. Hence we see it
come to pass, that pure self-consciousness makes itself reality, but,
at the same time, it first of all does so with subjective significance
as a self-consciousness that has taken up its position as such, and
that separates itself from objective existence, and hence is first of
all subject to a difference which it does not overcome.