Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
relationships which we call duties are consolidated after the manner
of a just condition of things, as well as being held by mind to be
fixed determinations. Because these duties do not merely appear to
hold good in a general sense, but are also recognized in my conscience
as having the character of the universal, the harmony of the rational
will and reality is established. On the one hand, the objective system
of freedom as necessity exists, and, on the other, the rational in
me is real as conscience. The Stoic principle has not yet reached
to this more concrete attitude, as being on the one hand abstract
morality, and, on the other, the subject that has a conscience. The
freedom of self-consciousness in itself is the principle, but it has
not yet attained to its concrete form, and its relation to happiness
exists only in its determination as indifferent and contingent, which
relation must be given up. In the concrete principle of rationality
the condition of the world, as of my conscience, is not, however,
indifferent.
This is a general description of Stoic morality; the main point is to
recognize its point of view and chief relationships. Because in the
Roman world a perfectly consistent position, and one conformable to
existing conditions, has attained to the consciousness of itself,
the philosophy of the Stoics has more specially found its home in the
Roman world. The noble Romans have hence only proved the negative, an
indifference to life and to all that is external; they could be great
only in a subjective or negative manner—in the manner of a private
individual. The Roman jurists are also said to have been likewise
Stoic philosophers, but, on the one hand, we find that our teachers of
Roman law only speak ill of Philosophy, and, on the other, they are
yet sufficiently inconsistent to state it to the credit of the Roman
jurists that they were philosophers. So far as I understand law, I can
find in it, among the Romans, nothing either of thought, Philosophy
or the Notion. If we are to call the reasoning of the understanding
logical thought, they may indeed be held to be philosophers, but this
is also present in the reasoning of Master Hugo, who certainly does not
claim to be a philosopher. The reasoning of the understanding and the
philosophic Notion are two different things. We shall now proceed to
what is in direct contrast to the Stoic philosophy, Epicureanism.
B. EPICURUS.