Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
If we sum this up in a general way, the determinate, whether it is
existent or thought, is (α) really, as determinate, the negative of
another, _i.e._ it is related to another and exists for the same, and
is thus in relationship; in this everything is really exhausted. (β) In
this relationship to another this last, posited as its universality,
is its reason; but this reason, as opposed to that which is proved,
is itself a determinate, and consequently has its reality only in
what is proved. And for the reason that I really again consider this
universal as a determinate, it is conditioned by another like the one
that goes before, and so on into infinity. (γ) In order that this
determinate for which, as in consciousness, the other is, should have
existence, this other must exist, for in this it has its reality;
and because this its object is likewise for another, they mutually
condition each other and are mediated through one another, neither
being self-existent. And if the universal as the basis has its reality
in the existent, and this existent its reality in the universal, this
forms the Reciprocity whereby what in themselves are opposites mutually
establish one another. (δ) But what is implicit is something which is
not mediated through another; as the immediate, that is because it is,
it is, however, an Hypothesis. (ε) Now if this determinate is taken as
pre-supposed, so also may another be. Or we might say more shortly that
the deficiency in all metaphysics of the understanding lies partly in
(α) the Demonstration, by which it falls into the infinite; and partly
in (β) the Hypotheses, which constitute an immediate knowledge.