Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
The two formal moments in this sceptical culture are firstly the power
of consciousness to go back from itself, and to take as its object the
whole that is present, itself and its operation included. The second
moment is to grasp the form in which a proposition, with whose content
our consciousness is in any way occupied, exists. An undeveloped
consciousness, on the other hand, usually knows nothing of what is
present in addition to the content. For instance, in the judgment “This
thing is one,” attention is paid only to the one and the thing, and
not to the circumstance that here something, a determinate, is related
to the one. But this relation is the essential, and the form of the
determinate; it is that whereby this house which is an individual,
makes itself one with the universal that is different from it. It is
this logical element, _i.e._ the essential element, that Scepticism
brings to consciousness, and on this it depends; an example of this is
number, the one, as the hypothetical basis of arithmetic. Scepticism
does not attempt to give the thing, nor does it dispute as to whether
it is thus or thus, but whether the thing itself is something; it
grasps the essence of what is expressed, and lays hold of the whole
principle of the assertion. As to God, for example, the Sceptics do not
inquire whether He has such and such qualities, but turn to what is
most inward, to what lies at the ground of this conception, and they
ask whether this has reality. “Since we do not know the reality of
God,” says Sextus (Pyrrh. Hyp. III. c. I, § 4), “we shall not be able
to know and perceive His qualities.” Likewise in the preceding books
(II. c. 4, sqq.), inquiry is made as to whether the criterion of truth
as fixed by the understanding is anything, whether we know the thing in
itself, or whether the ‘I’ is to itself the only absolute certainty.
This is the way to penetrate to reality.