Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
But we must have a clearer grasp of the difference between this point
of view and the earlier. Already in the earlier philosophies we have
seen, that νοῦς is the essence of the world, and similarly Aristotle
comprehended the whole series of things endued with life and mind in
such a way as to recognize the Notion to be the truth of these things.
In the case of the Stoics this unity, this system, was most definitely
brought forward, while Aristotle rather followed up the particulars.
This unity of thought we saw among the Stoics more especially on the
one side as the return of self-consciousness into itself, so that
spirit through the purity of thought is independent in itself; on the
other hand we have seen there an objectivity in which the λόγος became
essentially the all-penetrating basis of the whole world. With the
Stoics, however, this basis remained as substance only, and thus took
on the form of Pantheism, for that is the first idea that we light
on when we determine the universal to be the true. Pantheism is the
beginning of the elevation of spirit, in that it conceives everything
in the world to be a life of the Idea. For when self-consciousness
emerges from itself, from its infinitude, from its thought directed on
self, and turns to particular things, duties, relationships; or when
thought, which thinks this universal substance, passes over from it to
the particular, and makes the heavens, the stars, or man its object,
it descends from the universal immediately into the particular, or
immediately into the finite, since all these are finite forms. But
the concrete is the universal which makes itself particular, and in
this making of itself particular and finite yet remains eternally at
home with itself. In Pantheism, on the contrary, the one universal
substance merely makes itself finite, and thereby lowers itself. That
is the mode of emanation, according to which the universal, in making
itself the particular, or God in creating the world, by becoming
particular becomes debased or deteriorated and sets a limit to Himself;
so that this making of Himself finite is incompatible with any return
into Himself. The same relation is also found in the mythology of the
Greeks and Romans; the giving definiteness and form to God, who remains
no empty abstraction, is a rendering finite of God, who thus becomes
a mere work of art; but the Beautiful itself remains a finite form,
which is not brought to such a point as to express the free Idea. The
determination, the specialization, the reality of objectivity, must
now be of such a nature that it shall be adequate to the absolute
universal; the forms of the gods, as also natural forms and the forms
which are known as duties, fail to be thus adequate.