Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3) — Georg Hegel — John Shaqi
Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
possess the principle of evolution, of free development; everything
except Mind is only finite and transitory. When therefore Mind goes
forth to the particular, the particular is determined as something
plainly contained in this ideality, which Mind knows as something
subject to itself. That is the affirmative result of sceptical
philosophy. It is evident that, starting from this point of view, an
utterly different opinion will be expressed. God, as absolute pure Mind
in and for Himself, and His activity in Himself, are now the object.
But God is no longer known as the Abstract, but as the Concrete in
Himself, and this Concrete is nothing but Mind. God is living, the One
and the Other and the unity of these distinct determinations; for the
abstract is only the simple, but the living has difference in itself,
and is yet therein at home with itself.
Further, the following points have specially claimed the attention of
Mind; firstly, that this consciousness which has become subjective
makes its object the absolute as truth, placing this absolute outside
of itself; or that it attains to faith in God, that God is now
manifested, and reveals Himself, that is, exists for consciousness.
The absolute, altogether universal, posited at the same time as
objective, is God. Here comes in the relation of man to this his
object, to absolute truth. This new standpoint, which from this time
acquires an absolute interest, is therefore not a relation to external
things, duties and the like; these are all determined, limited, they
are not the all-embracing determination, as that is which has just
been spoken of. In this relation the mere turning of the subject on
himself, this talk of the wise man. in his one-sidedness, is likewise
done away with. The same liberty, happiness, steadfastness, which were
the aim of Epicureanism, Stoicism and Scepticism are doubtless still
to be reached by the subject, but now this can only be brought about
by turning to God, by giving heed to absolute truth, not by fleeing
from the objective; so that by means of the objective itself, liberty
and happiness are attained for the subject. This is the standpoint
of reverencing and fearing God, so that by man’s turning to this his
object, which stands before him free and firm, the object of the
subject’s own freedom is attained.
In the second place, there are contradictions herein contained which
necessarily attract the attention of mind, and whose reconciliation
is essential. If we adopt this one-sided position, God is on the one
side, and man in his freedom is on the other. A freedom such as this,
standing in contrast to the objective, a freedom in which man, as
thinking self-consciousness, conceives as the absolute the relation of
his pure inwardness to himself, is, however, only formally, and not
concretely absolute. In so far then as the human will determines itself
negatively towards the objective, we have the origin of sin, evil in
contrast to the absolute Affirmative.