Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume 2 (of 3)
Georg Hegel · en
This is a general description of the soul which is posited in the
world and reigns over it; and in as far as the substantial, which is
in matter, is similar to it, their inherent identity is asserted. The
fact that in it the same moments which constitute its reality are
contained, merely signifies that God, as absolute Substance, does not
see anything other than Himself. Plato hence describes the relation
of soul to objective reality thus: it, if it touches any of the
moments, whether dispersed in parts or indivisible, is stirred in all
its powers to declare the sameness and the difference of that or some
other thing, and how, where, and when, the individual is related to
the other and to the universal. “Now when the orbit of the sensuous,
moving in its due course, imparts knowledge of itself to its whole
soul” (where the different orbits of the world’s course show themselves
to correspond with the inwardness of mind) “true opinions and beliefs
arise. But when the soul applies itself to the rational and the orbit
of the self-identical makes itself known, thought is perfected into
knowledge.”[54] This is the essential reality of the world as of the
inherently blessed God; here the Idea of the whole is for the first
time perfected, and, in accordance with this Idea, the world first
makes its appearance. What had hitherto appeared was the reality of the
sensuous only and not the world as sensuous, for though Plato certainly
spoke before of fire, &c. (p. 75), he there gave only the reality of
the sensuous; he would hence have done better to have omitted these
expressions. In them we have the reason for its appearing as if Plato
had here begun to consider from the beginning that of which he has
already treated (_supra_, p. 72). For since we must begin from the
abstract in order to reach the true and the concrete, which first
appears later on (_supra_, p. 79), this last, when it has been found,
has the appearance and form of a new commencement, particularly in
Plato’s loose style.